

The Effect of Camera Installation on Violence at High Desert State Prison

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Executive Summary

The purpose of this study is to evaluate the effectiveness of the Audio Video Surveillance System (AVSS) pilot program at High Desert State Prison (HDSP). The pilot program installed cameras in the common areas of Facility B, or the Level 4 Sensitive Needs Yard (SNY), the Minimum Support Facility (MSF), and the Short Term Restricted Housing Unit (STRH). In total, cameras covered approximately 30 percent of the inmate population at HDSP. To assess the effectiveness of cameras, this study first determines whether violence was reduced after camera installation in HDSP. Second, this study tests whether cameras were responsible for the reduction in violence. Third, the research explores whether declines in violence were unique to HDSP or shared by other like facilities. Fourth, this study tests for camera effects on other negative behaviors. Fifth, this study assesses prison level change post-cameras. Sixth, this study tests for demographic correlates for involvement in violent and non-violent incidents. Taken together, the results of this study will offer the most comprehensive understanding of the impact of cameras on prison violence in California.

Data for this study were collected from the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). This study concludes that:

- ❖ Violence was reduced in areas where cameras were installed at HDSP.
- ❖ The reduction in violence cannot all be attributed to AVSS installation because the decline began prior to camera installation. In addition, areas without camera installation at HDSP also saw reductions in violence during the same period.
- ❖ The declines in violence at HDSP-B are relatively unique to the facility. Declines of similar frequency and magnitude were not observed by the other Level 4 SNY facilities.
- ❖ At the facility level, the reductions in negative behaviors during the experimental behavior are fairly contained to inmate-on-inmate violence, use of force, and staff victimization. There were no noticeable declines in lewd behavior, rule violations, weapon contraband, work violations, controlled substances, or participation in riots.
- ❖ At the prison level, there were reductions in allegations for use of force, discourteous treatment, and other officer-and-inmate relationship indicators. There were reductions in amount of force and type of force used, as well as the number of lockdown modified programs in the post-camera period. There were no reductions in contraband, inmate appeals, controlled substances, or suicides and homicides that were unique to HDSP.
- ❖ Demographic comparisons show differences in the types of inmates involved in violent incident reports (IRs) at HDSP. When compared to other HSEC facility inmates, HDSP inmates involved in violence were more likely to be younger, not a sex offender, not have a mental health

designation, and have more prior commitments. HDSP inmates involved in IRs were more likely to be Hispanic and less likely to be Black.

- ❖ This research identifies two areas that warrant future study. First, the trend in violence at HDSP-B appears to continuously increase after January 2016. Future trend analysis should examine whether the rate of violence will return to the baseline rate. Second, the high rate of lockdown modified program incidents at HDSP given the low rate of violence deserves further research attention.

In summary, numerous indicators in camera areas, at the facility level, and at the prison level support the idea that some intervention is decreasing the rate of violence at HDSP over and above what is observed in other CDCR facilities. However, the decrease begins prior to camera installation and occurs in areas of HDSP that did not have cameras installed. Thus, while cameras may be a factor, the results cannot confirm that cameras alone are responsible for the violence decline.

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Introduction

On Monday, October 3, 2016 the Audio Video Surveillance System (AVSS) pilot program went live at High Desert State Prison (HDSP). The pilot program included 196 new cameras with 345 camera views covering the inmate-accessible common areas of Facilities B, E (the Minimum Support Facility) and Z (the Short Term Restricted Housing Unit). The majority of cameras were used to cover HDSP, Facility B, or the Level 4 Sensitive Needs Yard (SNY). Cameras were installed at HDSP in response to reports of violence and excessive use of force at the prison (Barton, 2015).

In 2015 the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) conducted a special review of High Desert State Prison (HDSP), one of the 35 state prisons run by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). High Desert State Prison was the subject of this review because of allegations of excessive use of force against inmates, failure to protect inmates from assault and harm from others, mishandling of inmates with disabilities, and concerns regarding the internal review process (Barton, 2015). The OIG Report specifically identified the HDSP Level 4 SNY as having more total incidents involving use of force (Barton, 2015: 34), as compared to other HDSP yards and other SNYs in other prisons. The report details a series of problems at HDSP related to an entrenched correctional staff subculture often characterized by overt racism and bias, lax supervision, and failure to appropriately respond to inmates' needs even during immediate threats to inmates' safety. The Inspector General noted that the "number one fiscal priority" should be for CDCR to "install cameras in all inmate areas, including, but not limited to the exercise yards, rotundas, building dayrooms, patios, and program offices of HDSP." (Barton, 2015: 58). According to this report, the installation of cameras is the "absolute best tool" to curtail misconduct and assist in reducing excessive use of force.

As a result, cameras were installed in HDSP in 2016. This camera pilot program was the first step in determining if AVSS could reduce problem behaviors in a California institution. The cameras went live on October 3, 2016. In March 2017, CDCR requested additional funds to implement "comprehensive" video surveillance at High Desert State Prison (as well as another prison) to assist with investigations, reduce violent incidents, reduce contraband entering perimeters and reducing attempted suicides (LAO, 2017). The LAO expressed concerns that CDCR had not yet provided any evidence from the camera pilot project that the presence of AVSS could achieve those stated goals. They also questioned whether or not camera presence would simply displace illicit activities or suicide out of camera view. The purpose of this study is to analyze official data to assess whether there is any evidence that the installation of cameras reduced negative behaviors inside HDSP.

Previous Research on Cameras

While numerous states have adopted the use of cameras in correctional institutions, the number of empirical assessments on cameras in corrections is scarce and the quality of assessment is basic. A briefing of high-definition cameras installation in the Oklahoma County Detention Center reports significant improvement in the rate of violence, ease of investigations, and cost savings. Officials reported that investigation times were reduced from days or weeks (and still with inconclusive results) to minutes and with “irrefutable” results (NLECTC, 2011: 1). County officials reported camera footage was used to file criminal charges against inmates and staff, which significantly decreased the number of lawsuits filed against the county (NLECTC, 2011). Officials also reported a 90 percent reduction of staff-on-inmate and inmate-on-inmate altercations per month, but their findings were not part of a formal evaluation.

One study conducted in Australian prisons compared misconduct in surveilled areas with misconduct away from cameras’ line of sight (Allard, Wortley, & Stewart, 2008). The study was not a formal evaluation but rather a historical examination of incident records. The researchers found that about 75 percent of non-violent offenses occurred in areas not covered by a camera as compared to 59 percent of violent offenses. Violent offenses that demonstrated a degree of planning, like those involving a weapon or that involve multiple perpetrators, were more likely to be initiated outside the scope of cameras as opposed to those that involved only one perpetrator and no weapon.

The only evaluation to date that includes a pre- and post- comparison of correctional climate in America after the installation of cameras was conducted in one jail (LaVigne, Debus-Sherrill, & Downey, 2011). The researchers evaluated the impact of cameras on sexual assault in a jail that installed a camera system to eliminate blind spots and provide evidence for investigations. The camera footage was used in incident investigations, and shift commanders conducted a review of one-hour of random footage every month. Management and jail leadership had positive opinions of the cameras, while line officers had the negative opinion that cameras were being used to monitor staff behavior instead of inmate misconduct. Interviews with jail staff reported that they did not believe that the cameras deterred inmates who were intent on fighting, but that camera footage was useful for investigations. Inmates perceived less consensual and forced sexual behaviors to occur after the cameras were installed. Inmates also reported they believed less violence was occurring in the facility. However, the study did not explore whether inmates’ perceptions of increased safety were corroborated with an actual reduction in incidents.

The broader area of evaluation of video surveillance on crime in public spaces highlights the importance of studying “displacement” when considering the effects of cameras. Displacement refers to the idea that crime will move to areas where monitoring is absent or limited. A review of studies on Closed Circuit Television in public spaces found that displacement of crime is a legitimate problem (Phillips, 1999). Unlike public spaces where crime could move from one town or area to another, prison displacement would likely happen from the public spaces (i.e., yard or dayroom) to the private spaces (i.e., cell or bathroom) not within camera view.

To our knowledge, there has been no study that has systematically assessed the degree to which surveillance cameras in *prison* alter the perception and behavior of prison staff or prisoners in America.

Assessing Camera Effectiveness

Ideally a randomized experiment would be used to determine whether camera installation had an impact on violence. Because the pilot test did not incorporate random assignment, the ability to assess the effectiveness of cameras on violence and other negative outcomes depends primarily on utilizing strong comparison groups. To show camera effectiveness, the data would need to show a reduction in the rate of violence by timing and location that differed from other prisons and locations that were not covered by cameras. To test whether cameras were effective, this study will answer three questions. First, was violence reduced in areas where cameras were installed in HDSP? Second, did the violence reduction occur after the camera installation? Third, was the rate of violence otherwise unaffected in areas where cameras were not installed? These questions will be answered for HDSP, with comparisons made to other prisons and facilities. Data are from a “pre” period, 7 months prior to camera installation, are compared with a “post” period, of 7 months after camera installation.

Cameras will be assessed for their effect on violence (e.g., inmate-on-inmate, inmate-on-officer, physical, riot). This research will also examine whether cameras have any effect on other negative behaviors like use-of-force, staff injury, contraband, suicide, allegations against staff, inmate appeals, and lockdowns before and after installation.

This study compares the rates of violence of HDSP-B to the other HDSP facilities. HDSP-B is also compared with the other Level 4 SNY facilities within CDCR. These comparisons will be used to test the third effect stated above, or the comparison between camera areas and areas where cameras were not installed. Finally, this study examines the characteristics of the inmates involved in violence.¹ This study compares the demographic features of the inmate participants of violence at HDSP and comparison institutions.

Study Methods

Design. This study is a comparison of rates of negative behaviors in a pre- and post-design. The baseline period (i.e., the period before the intervention) spans 7 months, from March 2016 to September 2016. The cameras went live on October 3, 2016. The experimental period (i.e., the period after the intervention) is a 7 month period after camera activation, from October 2016 to April 2017.² This study compares the change in recorded behavior from the baseline to the experimental period in areas where cameras were installed compared to areas where cameras were not installed to measure whether there was a more significant decline in negative behaviors in areas where there was camera coverage.

¹ This study does not distinguish between a “victim” and a “perpetrator” of violence, primarily because the incident reports did not offer sufficient detail to make those determinations. Thus, an examination of inmate characteristics will reveal the features of inmates *involved* in violence, but not necessarily those that *cause* violence.

² This applies to datasets that reflect the monthly count of events across the 14 month period. The IR and RVR datasets have the exact date of the incident. Analyses using these datasets classify any incident that occurred between March 1, 2016 to October 2, 2016 as a “baseline incident” and any incident that occurred from October 3, 2016 to April 30, 2017 as an “experimental incident”.

Data. This study is an examination of official data from the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). This study relies heavily on two CDCR official data sources, Incident Reports (IRs) and Rule Violation Reports (RVRs). Incidents from these two data sources can be classified at the facility-level, not just at the prison-level. This is particularly important in this study because camera installation occurred in only a few facilities at HDSP, which covers only a fraction of the entire inmate population. The remaining data are measured at the prison-level and were collected by CDCR as part of their routine operations. These prison-level indicators include allegations, contraband, inmate appeals, lockdowns, and other measures of prison operations.³ A description of each measure is included below:

Allegations. Allegations were collected that represent the monthly, aggregate number of allegations grouped by type of offense for each prison⁴. Cameras were installed with the intention of reducing events including excessive use of force or battery. Not all types of allegations would be expected to be affected by cameras. This study examines allegations that could reasonably be impacted by surveillance like assault, battery, discourteous treatment, discrimination/harassment, misuse of authority, neglect of duty, use of force, or weapons. Allegation data can be prone to updating. In other words, as new allegations are brought forward, the recorded data can change, which is more likely to affect more recent data (i.e., experimental period). Therefore, it is important to realize these data may not be complete, and that despite seeming reductions in allegations, this could simply represent incomplete data. Despite these limitations, the data are presented here to accompany and provide a broader understanding of the potential impact of cameras.

Drug Contraband and Seizures. This study examines the number of drug seizure incidents at each prison as well as the total amount of drug contraband that was confiscated. The results are presented in this study, but with the caution that the number of drug seizure events also reflects institutional decision-making and departmental operations, thus may not be meaningfully impacted by camera installation.

Homicide & Suicide. Homicide and suicide information is available in IRs and, therefore, can be analyzed at the facility level. This analysis is included in this study. However, the complete investigation into a death is not always complete at the time an IR is entered in CDCR databases. Thus, this information may be unreliable or an underestimate. For example, an inmate may be found unresponsive in his cell. The IR is completed, and the inmate might be in the hospital. Later, that inmate may die, and the death may be ruled a homicide. The IR may or may not reflect the new information, but the aggregate count of homicides and suicides would. CDCR continually updates their aggregate number of suicides and homicides relying on the most current information for official reporting purposes. The aggregate number of homicide and suicide is only available for each prison (and not each facility). Despite this limitation, these

³ An analysis of escapes was originally intended for this study, but escape and escape attempts were too rare an event to perform any meaningful analysis. Across all high security prisons, during a 14-month study period, there were only 3 escape attempts, and none at High Desert State Prison.

⁴ Types of allegations include: assault, attendance, battery, confidential information, contraband, controlled substances, discourteous treatment, discrimination/harassment, dishonest, failure to report, insubordination, intoxication, medical, misuse of state equipment or property, neglect of duty, over-familiarity, retaliation, sexual misconduct, theft, threat/intimidation, use of force, weapon, other criminal acts, and other failure of good behavior.

numbers are utilized in this study to assess whether camera installation decreased the rate of homicide or suicides in prison.

Incident Reports (IRs). An Incident Report (IR) is a CDCR record that captures any use of force or incident that occurs in an institution. The Incident Reports, in particular, become the most important data source for this study. The synopsis of each incident was recoded to capture more detail about the incident including the number of inmates involved, the number of officers involved, and a precise location, so each incident could be classified as “in camera view” or “not in camera view” throughout HDSP and in the comparison facilities, even if cameras were not installed. The IR dataset also provides information on use of force and staff injury which is included in this study. In addition, inmate identifiers available in the synopsis were used to connect the IR database with inmate characteristics to understand the characteristics of inmates who are involved in violence. Incident offenses were classified for use in this study by offense type: violence, rule violations, weapons, controlled substances, lewd behavior⁵, riots, and suicide (which includes attempted suicide).

In general, this study recoded 7,313 IRs that represented the 9 High Security facilities (HSEC) across the 14- month study period. Of those IRs, 300 were reports that did not include inmates (i.e., facility issue or officer accident). The remaining 7,013 IRs were analyzed in this study.

Inmate Appeals. An aggregate count of inmate appeals for each prison for the 14-month study period was collected. Individual appeals were not available for analysis, so the results are limited. The aggregate count of appeals reflects the processing of the appeals and the general classification of the grievance.

Lockdown Modified Program. Lockdown modified program data represent the number of incidents per month. A lockdown is a restriction of all inmates to their cells/beds in at least one facility. There is not enough detail in the data to determine which facility within a prison experienced the lockdown. A lockdown generally follows a very serious threat to institutional security. According to CDCR, a lockdown should not occur for more than a 24-hour period. This study examines a change in the average number of lockdowns per month for each prison from the baseline to experimental period.

Rule Violation Report (RVRs). An RVR is an official report created by an officer in an institution for an inmate whose behavior is in violation of the law, regulations, or procedure. It is a disciplinary indicator. Unlike IRs, which can include multiple staff and inmates in a single incident, an RVR is assigned to individual inmates. If multiple inmates were involved in the same event, there would be multiple RVRs in the data. Thus, RVRs are our measure of individual behavior in institutions, while the IRs reflect the number of incidents.

While the RVRs do not offer an exact location for each incident, it does offer a notation of “in cell violence” or “not in cell violence” as determined by CDCR. Cameras were not installed in cells therefore, the rate of these types of RVRs should not change pre- and post-camera installation, but the non-cell violent incidents could be within camera range, and could be an

⁵ Lewd behavior includes indecent exposure and masturbation. Sexual assault is classified as a violent crime.

indication of camera effectiveness.⁶ RVRs were classified by type of offense: violent, work, riots, rules violation, contraband, and controlled substances.

RVRs were available for all prisons so comparisons can be made to all Level 4 SNY facilities, not just the Level 4 SNYs that are in HSEC prisons (like the IRs dataset).

Use of Force. In addition to the numerous measures of use of force provided by the IRs, CDCR aggregates the information on use of force by prison. This information is subdivided into categories of force (i.e., chemical, physical, or weapons). This study examines changes in the total amount of force used per month and the type of force used before and after camera activation. It is important to note that Use of Force data is examined in numerous ways in this study. Aggregate use of force collected by CDCR is used to examine prison level changes. Facility level comparisons of use of force stem from the IR dataset where this level of detail can be determined.

Demographics. Demographic data were collected for all inmates in all prisons on the 3rd of each month for the 14-months of study. The demographic dataset was used to calculate the facility population during the study period to calculate the rates of violence over time. Demographic data was also linked to the IR dataset to understand the characteristics of inmates involved in violence. Inmate characteristics examined in this study include: age at admission to CDCR⁷, sex offender status (PC 290), race/ethnicity, lifer status, mental health designation by CDCR, number of prior commitments, and commitment offense classified into person, property, drug, and other. The population does not include any inmates from community correctional facilities (not CDCR run, private, or public), does not include any facilities that house or treat female offenders (even if they also house or treat male offenders), state hospitals, legal processing unit offenders, or those at the Sacramento Control Office. In total, 10,073 CDCR numbers were included in the IRs that involved at least 1 inmate. A demographic data match was found for 98.3 percent of the inmates involved in the IRs.

Comparison Groups. High Desert State Prison is classified by CDCR as one of their “High Security” (HSEC) prisons. At the prison level, we rely on comparisons of HDSP to the other HSEC prisons include: California Correctional Institution (CCI), California State Prison, Corcoran (COR), Kern Valley State Prison (KVSP), California State Prison, Los Angeles County (LAC), Pelican Bay State Prison (PBSP), California State Prison, Sacramento (SAC), Substance Abuse Treatment Facility (SATF), and Salinas Valley State Prison (SVSP).⁸

⁶ Violent RVRs that are not in cells could still include incidents that are not in camera view. For example, incidents that occur in bathrooms or private offices would might still not be covered by cameras but classified as “not in cell.” An analysis of IRs, suggest that in HDSP-B no incidents occurred in private areas of the facility except cells, thus, there is good reason to believe that the RVR analysis using only delineating private spaces as cells will still provide informative results.

⁷ This measure reflects the age at the first admission to CDCR on the current commitment. In some instances, individuals may be committed to CDCR prior to their 18th birthday. For example, demographic data show that 2.5 percent of the HDSP population was admitted to CDCR before they were 18. This does not mean that these inmates were being housed at HDSP at that age; it is simply the age in which they were committed to CDCR. These individuals could have first been housed in a Division of Juvenile Justice facility until they were transferred to an adult prison.

⁸ According to the CDCR website, California City Correctional Facility (CAC) is considered a High Security facility. However, CAC was excluded as a comparison prison because it was significantly smaller than the other HSEC

A majority of cameras were installed in Facility B at HDSP. HDSP-B houses approximately 24 percent of the inmate population at HDSP, or approximately 880 inmates during the study period. Some cameras were installed to cover the common areas of the Minimum Support Facilities at HDSP, or approximately 140 inmates (3.9 percent of the HDSP population). Finally, cameras were installed to cover the common areas of the short term restricted housing unit at HDSP to cover the estimated 100 inmates housed there at any given time (2.7 percent of the entire prison population). In total, camera installation covered about 30 percent of the inmate population at HDSP.

Cameras were only installed in common areas of a facility. Cameras were not installed in private areas like cells or bathrooms, so we would expect that rates of violence would not change in those areas. Comparison groups include: 1) areas in camera facilities that are not covered by cameras, 2) facilities in HDSP without camera installation, and 3) facilities in other prisons without camera installation. Each comparison group offers insight into the general trend of violence that “would have” occurred had cameras never been installed. In some areas we aggregate multiple comparison facilities together into one “cohort” for comparison this synthetic cohort becomes a better match of HDSP-B to analyze trends after cameras.

Analysis. This study compares the number and rate of violent incidents during the 7-month baseline period with the 7-month experimental period (i.e., post-camera activation). The results of this study are largely descriptive where the direction and magnitude of difference are compared as opposed to relying predominantly on statistical tests. Where applicable, descriptive statistics are included, however often there are few incidents for certain comparisons and statistics require a sufficient sample size to detect differences.

Synthetic Cohort Analyses. The use of the pre-and post-comparisons at HDSP-B is one way to estimate how an intervention, in this case camera installation, affected the incidence of violence. In addition, we use comparison groups (i.e., other non-treated facilities and prisons) to understand if the observed difference is unique to HDSP-B or consistent with trends found in non-treated facilities. If non-treated facilities show similar declines in violence, then the decreases are not due to cameras. One limitation of using other CDCR facilities is that those facilities may be significantly different than HDSP-B in a number of ways, and thus would not be an appropriate comparison. Thus, in an attempt to construct the most ideal comparison group for a case study like camera implementation, researchers have developed a statistical method called the “synthetic control method” (e.g., Abadie, Diamond & Hainmueller, 2009).

The synthetic control method essentially “creates” a facility from all other CDCR facilities that best approximates HDSP-B in the baseline period. Understanding that there is no one facility that most accurately mirrors HDSP-B, the method uses a weighted combination of all of the other facilities (i.e., the control group) where cameras were not installed. Control facilities that look most similar to HDSP-B are given “more weight” as part of the synthetic control facility, otherwise known as “Synthetic HDSP-B.” Facilities that do not closely approximate HDSP-B are given little to no weight as part of Synthetic HDSP-B. Synthetic HDSP-B is created by using the pattern of violent offending during the baseline period as well as the characteristics of the inmates housed in the facility during the same time. Ideally, the difference in the means on each matching variable for HDSP-B and Synthetic HDSP-B would be zero.

facilities and during the study period, only housed level 2 inmates, which was a profile unlike any other HSEC facility. Also, according to the 2017 Legislative Analyst’s Office Budget and Policy post, CAC has had cameras installed in all public areas of the facility.

Then, the trend in violence for HDSP-B is compared with the trend in violence of Synthetic HDSP-B. If that match was successful, the pattern of violence for the two facilities would look identical during the baseline period. Then, at the point of the introduction of the intervention (i.e., camera activation), the trends would either continue together or diverge. If the trend in violence at HDSP-B coincides with the Synthetic HDSP-B trend after camera activation then we can conclude, regardless of any decreases in levels of violence, that the cameras did not impact the rate of violence over and above what would have been expected in the facility if cameras were not activated. If the levels of violence in HDSP-B significantly depart from the violence in Synthetic HDSP-B after cameras, then we can conclude that the cameras were responsible for the change at HDSP-B because we know that except for the introduction of cameras, the two facilities were otherwise “equal.”

The study results are presented in five sections. The first section answers the question of whether violence was reduced in HDSP after cameras were installed. The second section addresses the timing of violence changes and whether reductions were unique to only camera areas at HDSP. The third section compares camera effects at HDSP-B with the other Level 4 SNY facilities. The fourth section assesses the effect of cameras on non-violent outcomes. The fifth section looks at outcomes that are measured only at the prison level. The final section of the report compares the characteristics of inmates in CDCR, other HSEC prisons and HDSP. This section also examines if any demographic features are correlated with certain types of offending.

Results

I. Was there a significant reduction in violence after camera installation at HDSP?

IRs for Violence

Table 1 compares the number and percent of Incident Reports (IRs) for physical violence recorded before and after cameras were installed at HDSP. The data are presented by area where cameras were installed at HDSP⁹ versus those where cameras were not installed¹⁰. The table shows, that a majority of the IRs occurred in areas without cameras. This is expected because cameras were only installed to cover approximately 30 percent of the entire HDSP population.

⁹ Areas where cameras were installed include the public spaces in Facility B, Facility E (the Minimum Support Facility), Facility Z (the Short Term Restricted Housing Unit), and Facilities A and B Visiting. As a note, no IRs for violence were recorded in Facility A visiting during the baseline or the experimental periods, so results for Facility A are presented entirely as a “No Camera” section for ease of reporting instead of having a separate section for Facility A Visiting as a “camera area” with only 0 cells.

¹⁰ Areas where cameras were not installed included the private spaces in Facilities B, E, and Z (i.e., cells and bathrooms). Other areas without cameras include all of Facilities A (as noted in footnote 9), C, and D.

Table 1. Number of Incident Reports for violence by camera installation areas at High Desert State Prison.

Research Period				
	Baseline	Experimental	Total	Change
	n	n	N	% (n)
No Cameras	98	85	183	-13.3% (-13)
Cameras	64	32	96	-50.0% (-32)
Total	162	117	279	-27.8% (-45)

$\chi^2(1) = 4.45, p < .05$

Results in Table 1 suggest that there is a significant relationship between camera installation and experimental period on incidents of physical assaults. In other words, there was a greater decline in violence in camera areas than in non-camera areas after AVSS installation. The table shows that there were declines in violence in all areas in the experimental period, but the non-camera areas demonstrated a 13 percent reduction in violence after cameras were installed while the camera areas saw a 50 percent reduction in violence during the same period.

Table 2 presents a closer examination of HDSP Facility B, the primary area of camera installation. An examination of HDSP-B shows that the IRs for violence did decrease in camera areas during the experimental period (decrease of 45.6% or 26 IRs). The non-camera areas suggest a slight displacement effect of cameras on violence. Displacement refers to the movement of violence from a camera area to a non-camera area to avoid detection. One concern regarding the implementation of camera surveillance is that violence would simply move, creating a decrease in violence in one area, an increase in another, but overall demonstrate no change in the total violence. The IR data show an increase of 28.6 percent, which represents an increase of 2 violence incidents in the non-camera areas after activation.

Table 2. Number of Incident Reports for physical assaults by camera installation areas in HDSP Facility B.

Research Period				
	Baseline	Experimental	Total	Change
	n	n	N	% (n)
No Cameras	7	9	16	+28.6% (+2)
Cameras	57	31	88	-45.6% (-26)
Total	64	40	104	-37.5% (24)

Fisher's Exact Test $P = .06$

However, because a majority of the violence in HDSP-B is in camera areas, HDSP-B still experienced an overall reduction of violence in the post-camera period. The change in violence in HDSP-B has relatively few observations in the no camera areas, so the Fishers exact test is most appropriate and suggests it is trending toward statistical significance (Fisher's Exact Test, $P = .06$).

Figure 1 shows the effect of cameras on different types of violence. While IRs for riots are included in the "violence" category, the number of riots ($n = 4$; 3 pre-cameras, 1 post-cameras) during the research period at HDSP was so low that the results were excluded in Figure 1. The overall trend in types of violence at HDSP shows that a majority of the violent incidents were between inmates as opposed to inmate-on-officer.¹¹ During the entire 14-month study period, there were 229 IRs for inmate-on-inmate

¹¹ IR incidents were recoded by the research team for the initial cause of the incident. Therefore, the research coding of the incident may or may not match the CDCR coding of the incident offense. In some instances, for example, CDCR may have coded an incident "Battery on an Officer" because an officer was assaulted during the

violence and 45 for inmate-on-officer violence. A majority of the reduction in inmate-on-inmate violence occurred in the camera areas at HDSP after AVSS installation. The areas where AVSS were installed had 50 IRs for inmate-on-inmate violence prior to activation, which dropped by 50 percent, to 25 incidents, after the cameras coverage began. This difference was found to be statistically significant ($\chi^2(1) = 4.84, p < .05$).

Inmate-on-officer IRs also declined in camera areas, from 12 in the baseline period to 5 in the experimental period (a 58 percent decline); however, the areas of HDSP where cameras were not activated also experienced a decline in inmate-to-officer violence, from 18 to 10 incidents, or a 44.4 percent decline. The change in violence against officers post-cameras has small cell sizes so significance is difficult to detect, still, these data do not support a camera effect on inmate-on-officer violence with this measure (Fisher's exact test, $P = .24$).




Figure 1. Changes in type of violence (no riot) before and after camera installation at HDSP.

RVRs for Violence

As stated prior, RVRs are another data source that can be used to explore camera effects on violence. Because there is no location indicator in these data, this study relies on the CDCR created indicator of whether the RVR was for violence in a cell or not in a cell. Violence in cell at HDSP-B, as stated before, would not be under camera view, whereas violent RVRs for incidents not in a cell would most likely be under camera view. Table 3 presents the change in RVRs for violence in HDSP-B before and after camera installation.

course of an incident, but the officer was battered while responding to two inmates fighting each other. In such an instance, the research coding would be inmate-on-inmate violence. Any officer injury, regardless of research coding, is included in later sections of the research.

Table 3. RVRs for violence (no riot) in HDSP-B by location of incident.

Type of RVR	Research Period			
	Baseline	Experimental	Total	Difference
	n	n	N	% (n)
Not Cell Violence	174	103	277	-40.1% (-71)
Cell Violence	18	24	42	+33.3% (+6)
Total	192	127	319	-33.8% (-65)

$\chi^2(1) = 6.06, p < .05$

Table 3 shows that a majority of RVRs for violence in HDSP-B were not in cells, and therefore likely under camera view. Violent RVRs that were not in cells were reduced over 40 percent after camera activation from 174 incidents in a 7-month period to 103 during the following 7-month period. In contrast, incidents of cell violence increased after cameras were installed in HDSP-B by 33.3 percent. Like the trend of the IRs, these results suggest a displacement effect post-camera installation. In other words, after cameras were activated, more violent incidents occurred in non-camera areas than during the pre-camera period.

Section I Summary: IR and RVR data converge to support the same conclusion; there was a reduction in violence at HDSP after camera installation. While violence was reduced after camera implementation in HDSP-B, the level of violence in non-camera areas increased. The displacement effect, however, was slight in comparison to the magnitude of the overall reduction in violence for the facility. In other words, the reduction in violence in camera areas was far greater than the slight increase in the non-camera areas. Overall, the number of violent incidents was significantly lower in camera areas at HDSP-B and at HDSP more generally.

II. Were cameras responsible for the reduction in violence at HDSP?

To conclude that cameras were the driving force behind a reduction in violence, the data would have to show that violence was 1) significantly reduced in areas where cameras were activated, 2) the reduction occurred during the experimental period (i.e., not prior to camera activation), and 3) similar reductions did not occur in non-camera areas. The previous section tested the first question, and showed that violence was significantly reduced in areas where cameras were activated.

This section tests whether cameras, and not some other intervention (or random chance), were responsible for the reduction in violence at HDSP. These two points are particularly important because we know that HDSP implemented several reforms in the prison in the months prior to, and during camera installation and activation. Thus, reductions in violence observed at HDSP could be a result of a different reform that was implemented in the prison, and not specifically the effect of AVSS.

Timing of Reduction in Violence

Figure 2 shows the trend of IRs in HDSP-B over the study period. The trend lines show that rate of violence in the non-camera areas is relatively steady. HDSP-B has fewer than 2 incidents of violence in non-camera areas per month with relatively little fluctuation. A slight uptick in number of violent IRs is

noticeable toward the end of the study period. The trend of violence in camera areas is more variable. Figure 2 shows that the decline in the incidents of violent IRs at HDSP-B began in July 2016, prior to camera activation on October 3rd. From July to October there were steep declines in violence in the facility. The frequency of violence in camera areas at HDSP-B generally decreases until January 2017, when it begins to increase until the end of the study period.

While it is significant that the overall amount of violence after cameras was less than in the baseline period, from an evaluation perspective, this trend contradicts the required temporal ordering. The sharpest decline occurred before camera installation which makes it difficult to conclude that cameras alone were responsible for the decrease in violence.

The gradual increase in violence from January 2017 to the end of the study period is worthy of future research. It is important to explore whether the rates of violence continued to climb after April 2017. This would be an indication that the intervention only had short-term effects and may not be a reliable long-term violence solution.




Figure 2. Number of violent IRs by camera and non-camera areas in HDSP-B.

Figure 3 shows the trend of RVRs for violence in HDSP-B in cells (i.e., not camera area) and not in cells (i.e., camera areas). The trend for a reduction in RVRs seems to begin around the time of camera activation but is relatively short-lived, as it decreases only through January. Then, like the IRs, the RVRs begin to increase. The number of RVRs increases to the point of approaching baseline violence numbers. The number of violent incidents occurring out of view of cameras also increases near the end of the study period.




Figure 3. Number of violent RVRs by cell and non-cell areas in HDSP-B.

The timing of the decline in IR violence in HDSP-B suggest that either the camera effect began before the activation period due to some factor related to camera activation or was due to an a non-camera related intervention that was implemented around July 2016. Either way, the timing of the violence reduction is not consistent with the October 3rd camera activation date. The decline in RVRs is more consistent with camera installation but declines continue only through January and then begin significantly increasing through the rest of the experimental period. Both IRs and RVRs support a need to examine even longer-term effects of violence trends at HDSP, as both begin to rise after January 2017.

Reductions in Non-Camera Areas

This analysis explores whether declines in violence also occurred in areas of the prison where cameras were not installed. Declines in violence in non-camera areas would suggest that violence is affected by a non-camera related intervention implemented in HDSP (or CDCR wide). Table 4 compares the difference in violence by HDSP facilities pre- and post-cameras. In general, the total number of violent incidents in the MSF and STRH were small, so any reduction leads to an inflated percent difference. All areas where cameras were installed showed declines in violence post-installation. This would support camera effectiveness. However, even facilities without camera installation showed declines in violence from the baseline to experimental periods. Facility A, for example, with no camera installation showed a larger percent decline in violence than the camera-areas of Facility B. Facility D, also without camera installation, saw a decline in violence after the camera period.

Table 4. Number of Incident Reports for violence in camera range by HDSP facility.

HDSP Facility	Baseline n	Experimental n	Difference n (%)	Camera Presence
Facility A	26	13	-13 (-50.0%)	No Cameras
Facility B	7	9	+2 (+28.6%)	No Cameras
	57	31	-26 (-45.6%)	Cameras
Facility C	22	26	+4 (+18.2%)	No Cameras
Facility D	39	32	-7 (-17.9%)	No Cameras
MSF	0	0	0 (0%)	No Cameras
	2	0	-2 (-100%)	Cameras
STRH	4	3	-1 (-25.0%)	No Cameras
	5	1	-4 (-80.0%)	Cameras

Figure 4 more clearly demonstrates the change by converting the number of violent IRs into the 7-month rate based on the average population of the facility during the time period. From the rates, it is clear that HDSP-B, during the baseline period, has the highest rate of violence in public spaces than the other facilities. In general, the facilities with camera coverage all had reductions in the rate of violence from the baseline to the experimental period. The decline is most pronounced in the Short Term Restricted Housing Unit (STRH), because the population of the facility is much smaller. While camera areas had marked decline in violence, facilities with no camera installation also had declines in violence which could indicate an amplification effect with a shared intervention or some other contamination effect.




Figure 4. Change in rate of violent IRs in camera areas by HDSP facility (per 100 inmates) pre- and post-camera (* indicates had cameras installed).

Figure 5 shows the rate of violent IRs for the four largest HDSP facilities across the study period (e.g., HDSP-A, HDSP-B, HDSP-C, HDSP-D). As can be seen from the trend lines, the facilities do not share a similar pattern of violence trajectories over time. In other words, the peaks and valleys of violence do not coincide well with each other. The comparison of facility trend lines does not support any one shared event that uniformly impacted violence across the research period. Only HDSP-B seems to have experienced a consistent decline in violence over time. While the facilities may have seen reductions in overall violence, from month to month, it does not appear to be systematic.




Figure 5. Change in rate of violent IRs by HDSP facility (per 100 inmates).

Figure 6 presents the trends in violent incidents for HDSP-B versus the Synthetic Cohort Unit, or Synthetic HDSP-B. Synthetic HDSP-B was created using the covariates age of commitment to CDCR, number of priors, commitment offense, and prior IRs to identify and weight facilities that best match HDSP-B during the baseline period (see Table A1 in Appendix A). The IR dataset only includes incidents for HSEC prisons; therefore, the number of possible facilities to match on is limited to only HSEC facilities. As can be seen in Table A1, the average mean difference between the covariates of HDSP-B and Synthetic HDSP-B is small (.89) which indicates a sufficient match. Unfortunately, the model that matches well for HDSP-B does not work well for the other facilities used to make comparisons, so conditions were not met to allow the use of the permutations for a test of significance. Thus, Figure 6 is best understood descriptively and not as a formal statistical model.

HDSP-B and Synthetic HDSP-B are matched across the baseline period, at the point of the experimental condition (i.e., the vertical dotted line) the divergence of the lines indicate that after camera indication, HDSP-B, for much of the period, had fewer violent incidents than would be expected if no cameras were installed. Again, this analysis cannot say whether the difference in the post-period between HDSP-B and Synthetic HDSP-B is statistically significant, but the descriptive results suggest that there is an effect.




Figure 6. HDSP-B v Synthetic Cohort in IR changes for baseline and experimental period.

A review of the rate of change in RVRs (see Figure 7 below) in non-cell areas of HDSP shows Facility B and MSF, both camera areas, saw the largest declines in violence. Facility A and D, both not camera areas, showed less pronounced reductions. Like the IRs, the RVRs show Facility C experienced slight increases in violence in the experimental period. The most significant departure in the RVRs from the IRs is in the STRH unit. After camera installation, the rate of IRs in the STRH unit was reduced dramatically, but the rate of RVRs for violence increased after cameras.




Figure 7. Change in rate of violent RVRs (no riot) not in cells by HDSP facility (per 100 inmates) pre- and post-camera (*indicates had cameras installed).

Figure 8 shows the rate of RVRs in the largest HDSP facilities over the study period. Like the trend in IRs, there is no consistency in the increases and decreases of violence across the facilities. There appears to be no unifying policy across the prison that changed rates of violence in multiple facilities consistently and simultaneously. Similar to the IRs, regardless of overall decreases in violence from baseline to experimental periods, the trends in violence in Facilities A and D do not follow any notable pattern.




Figure 8. Change in the rate of violent RVRs (no riot) by HDSP facility (per 100 inmates).

Figure 9 presents the trends in violent RVRs for HDSP-B versus Synthetic HDSP-B. Synthetic HDSP-B was created using the proportion of lifers in a facility, age of commitment to CDCR, number of priors, commitment offense, and prior RVRs to identify and weight facilities that best match HDSP-B during the baseline period (see Table A2 in Appendix A). The mean differences in the predictors are minimal, suggesting a good match between HDSP-B and Synthetic HDSP-B. However, as can be seen from Figure 9, the violent RVRs during the baseline period does not appear to closely match the synthetic cohort. One reason for this is that Synthetic HDSP-B is an average of multiple facilities during the baseline period so it will not be prone to the fluctuations of a single facility like HDSP-B. RVRs for all CDCR facilities were examined to create Synthetic HDSP-B, in contrast to the IRs where only facilities in the HSEC prisons were available. Therefore, the donor pool was more robust. While it looks like a poor match at any single point in the time frame, the analysis suggests that over the baseline period, the match is better than the synthetic cohort used in the IR analysis. As such, statistical significance could be inferred for this analysis.




Figure 9. HDSP-B v Synthetic Cohort in change in RVR across baseline and experimental period.

The key to a synthetic cohort analysis is the convergence or divergence of the trend lines after camera activation (i.e., the dotted vertical line). The results show that post-cameras the trend for violent RVRs in

HDSP-B decreased to January and then increased until the end of the study period, as noted in previous sections of this report. The trend for Synthetic HDSP-B is almost always more than the number of RVRs for HDSP-B. The model statistics suggest that the difference in the trends of RVR during the experimental period for HDSP-B and Synthetic HDSP-B is significant. This means that the drop in RVRs in the experimental period is more than one would expect if no intervention were implemented. The difference in trend lines disappears in the last few months of study, again, suggesting that future research needs to be conducted to examine whether any effects continued past the current study period.

Section II Summary: Taken together, the analyses of IRs and RVRs in HDSP suggest that there is evidence that violence decreased in the areas where cameras were installed (with the exceptions of RVRs in the STRH facility). The synthetic cohort analysis supports that the decrease in violence was more significant than would be expected without an intervention. However, the change in violence preceded the activation of cameras (i.e., did not have the appropriate temporal ordering). A comparison to other HDSP facilities suggests that the reductions in violence were not limited to the areas that received cameras which limits a conclusion that cameras were the sole cause of the reduction in violence. However, a comparison of violence trends in the largest HDSP facilities was not consistent with a prison policy that similarly affected all facilities. This lends support to some intervention specific to HDSP-B that led to decreases in violence.

III. Are the declines in violence unique to HDSP?

Multiple facilities at HDSP, including some that did not have cameras installed, demonstrated a decline in violence in the experimental period. One explanation for this could be that cameras have a farther reach than their physical location. For example, cameras may signal to all inmates and staff that administration is committed to addressing violence in a prison. This might alter inmates' and/or officers' behavior even in non-camera areas. Alternatively, it may not be cameras that significantly influenced violence at HDSP. It could be any number of other new policies, programs, or changes that were enacted during the same period. Finally, it could be that the changes at HDSP are not unique at all. One possibility is that rates of violence were decreasing in other facilities around CDCR even without camera installation, and that the decrease in violence at HDSP is simply consistent with a broader trend in the agency. If the trends of HDSP are statistically similar to or less extreme than other facilities run by CDCR, then it would be a good indication that cameras had no significant effect on violence over and above what would be expected without cameras, and that decreases are either a normal fluctuation in violence rates or part of an agency-wide trend.

To test the uniqueness of violence trends at HDSP, we compare the changes at HDSP-B (i.e., cameras) with the other Level 4 SNY facilities (i.e., no cameras).¹² We compare the rates of violence in “would be” camera areas. “Would be” camera areas are places in each prison that would be under camera view IF

¹² The IRs analysis compares HDSP-B to other Level 4 SNYs in the High Security (HSEC) prisons. The RVR analysis compares HDSP-B with all any Level 4 SNY in any CDCR facility.

CDCR had installed cameras in all facilities like it had in HDSP-B (i.e., in public spaces). This is because facilities vary in the frequency of violence in public areas. Table 5 shows the proportion of violent IRs classified in either a camera area or not a camera area. Again, this is the proportion of incidents that “would” have been in camera view if cameras were installed in each facility like HDSP.

Table 5. Proportion of violent IRs that would be in camera areas during baseline.

	CCI-A	COR-03B	HDSP-B	KVSP-C	KVSP-D	SVSP-D
Camera Area	% (n)					
No	23.5% (16)	22.1% (23)	10.9% (7)	22.1% (19)	12.2% (9)	17.2% (23)
Yes	76.5% (52)	77.9% (81)	89.1% (57)	77.9% (67)	87.8% (65)	82.8% (111)

The table shows that over 89 percent of the violent IRs at HDSP-B were in camera areas. This makes HDSP-B a good candidate for cameras to affect violence in public spaces. All of the facilities had over 75 percent of their violence in camera range. Therefore, for the most part, cameras in public spaces appear to be a reasonable option for controlling the majority of violence that happens in Level 4 SNYs.

Figure 10 shows the change in the rate of violent IRs in “camera areas” in the HSEC Level 4 SNY facilities at baseline and experimental periods. Because only HDSP-B actually had cameras installed, the expectation would be that the baseline and the experimental rate for all of the other facilities should be equal or not statistically different. A few things are quite notable in Figure 10. First, the rate of violence at HDSP, even at baseline, is the lowest of any of the other Level 4 SNY facilities. This is particularly noteworthy because the OIG report specifically targeted HDSP because of the problematic behavior in the Level 4 SNY facility. These data suggest that when compared with other Level 4 SNY facilities, HDSP-B is the least violent facility. Second, three of the six facilities showed no statistically significant change in violence from the baseline period to the experimental period (i.e., the expected result in non-camera facilities) in the camera areas. Third, while two other Level 4 SNY facilities showed declines in violence, HDSP-B had the largest decrease (HDSP difference = -2.80, KVSP-C difference = -1.95, SVSP-D difference = -2.26).




Figure 10. Change in the rate of violent IR in camera areas in HSEC Level 4 Sensitive Needs Facilities (rate per 100 inmates).

Figure 11 compares the changes in violence rates at the three facilities showing significant declines. This figure reveals the nature of the declines. As stated earlier, the violence in HDSP-B begins to decline in July 2016 until cameras were activated, then stays relatively stable until it begins a slight uptick toward the end of the study period. The change in violence at KVSP-C begins to decrease in September 2016 until it reaches its lowest point in November, then rises a bit but stays relatively stable until a bigger decline in March 2017. SVSP-D violence declines begin in November 2016 and continues quite dramatically until March 2017, and then begins to increase. These trends in declines do not mirror each other in a way that suggests that they were “caused” by the same intervention.




Figure 11. Changes in the rate of physical violence in Level 4 SNY facilities experiencing reductions in the experimental period.

RVRs for Violence

Table 6 compares RVRs at HDSP-B with the other Level 4 SNY’s maintained by CDCR (not just the Level 4 SNYs in the HSEC facilities). Again, compared to other Level 4 SNY facilities HDSP-B has a relatively low rate of RVRs, even before cameras were installed. Despite the relative infrequency of RVRs, the almost 41 percent decline at HDSP-B was the most significant decrease of any of the Level 4 SNYs.

Table 6. Change in RVRs for violence (no riot) in non-cell areas from baseline to experimental for Level 4 SNY facilities.

	CAL-D	CCI-A	COR-03B	HDSP-B	KVSP-C	KVSP-D	MCSP-A	RJD-C	SVSP-D
Baseline (n)	76	148	248	174	188	190	242	327	304
Experimental (n)	68	206	261	103	181	174	217	271	253
Difference (n)	-8	58	13	-71	-7	-16	-25	-56	-51
Difference (%)	-10.5%	39.2%	5.2%	-40.8%	-3.7%	-8.4%	-10.3%	-17.1%	-16.8%

$\chi^2(8) = 33.3, p < .01$

Figure 12 shows the 7-month rate of RVRs for violence in non-cell areas. Again, while other facilities showed a decline in RVR period, no facility showed a decline as large as HDSP-B.




Figure 12. Change in monthly rate of violent RVRs (no riot) in non-cell areas in Level 4 SNY facilities by study period.

Section III Summary: These results support previous findings that the decrease in violence at HDSP is unique and greater in magnitude than any decline that was observed in comparable facilities. While these results cannot definitively conclude that cameras were the difference, it certainly is support that something at HDSP is affecting violence.

IV. Did cameras have an impact on any other type of negative behaviors?

The installation of cameras was originally recommended as a use of force reduction tool, as well as a violence reduction tool, by the Office of the Inspector General (Barton, 2015). CDCR noted that cameras could be used to reduce the rate of suicide and contraband in the facilities (LAO, 2016). To test some of these claims this study examined other non-violent, negative behaviors. These behaviors include contraband, suicide, rule violations, lewd behavior, use of force, and allegations.

First, it is important to understand how often these types of offenses actually occur within camera view. Because cameras were only installed in public areas, it would be less realistic to assume that cameras could significantly reduce the rate of events that occur primarily in private spaces. As we saw earlier in Table 5, violence occurs predominantly in the public areas of the prison, so it is reasonable to assume the cameras could be effective on those types of incidents. Table 7 shows the proportion of IRs for negative behaviors that occur in and out of camera view during the baseline period for the Level 4 SNY facilities in HSEC prisons. The first column “violence” is the aggregated information from Table 5, and the rest of the table includes the data for IRs for controlled substances (i.e., either in possession or under the influence), weapon contraband, attempted or completed suicides, and violating prison rules.

Table 7. Proportion of IRs for negative events in all HSEC Level 4 SNYs that occur in and out of camera area in baseline period.

Camera Area	Violence % (n)	Controlled Substance % (n)	Lewd Conduct % (n)	Rule Violation % (n)	Suicide % (n)	Weapon % (n)
No	23.8% (444)	60.8% (174)	86.0% (356)	42.7% (163)	90.3% (140)	67.1% (210)
Yes	76.2% (1425)	39.2% (112)	14.0% (58)	57.3% (219)	9.7% (15)	32.9% (103)

As can be seen from the table, a majority of the incidents of controlled substances, weapons contraband, and suicide are occurring in the private spaces in the prison. Cameras may not, then, have much of an effect on these types of incidents. Rule violations, like resisting an officer or threatening staff is just slightly more likely to occur in public spaces. Each of these types of incidents will be tested in this section. It is important to note that because the frequency of each type of non-violent incident is low, the analysis will be primarily descriptive in nature.

Table 8 presents the difference in rate of IRs in camera areas from the baseline period to the experimental period for each Level 4 SNY facility across different types of behaviors. As shown previously, HDSP-B saw a significant reduction in violence from one period to the other. However, the data also show smaller declines for the other types of negative behaviors. While there were reductions in IRs for controlled substances, rule violations, and weapons possession at HDSP-B, these declines were not larger than other facilities, so they cannot be attributed to cameras.

Table 8. Change in IRs in camera areas from baseline to experimental period in HSEC Level 4 SNY facilities.

	Violence Rate Diff.	Controlled Substance Rate Diff.	Lewd Conduct Rate Diff.	Rule Violation Rate Diff.	Suicide/ Attempted Rate Diff.	Weapon Rate Diff.
CCI-A	0.90	0.00	0.00	-0.18	0.17	-0.42
COR-03B	-0.03	0.14	-0.11	-0.07	0.12	-0.44
HDSP-B	-2.79	-0.11	0.00	-0.22	0.00	-0.22
KVSP-C	-1.97	0.23	0.00	-0.31	0.11	0.12
KVSP-D	0.20	0.01	-0.12	-0.59	0.00	-0.35
SVSP-D	-2.06	-0.23	0.14	-0.10	-0.11	0.57

Table 9 reports the change in RVRs from baseline to experimental periods. There is no decrease in non-violent RVRs at HDSP-B. These results together suggest that whatever intervention was decreasing violence was not similarly reducing all other types of IRs and RVRs.

Table 9. Change in rate of RVRs in non-cell areas from baseline to experimental period in Level 4 SNYs.

	Violence (with riot)	Violence (no riot)	Riot	Contra- band	Controlled Substance	Prison Rules	Work
	Rate Diff.	Rate Diff.	Rate Diff.	Rate Diff.	Rate Diff.	Rate Diff.	Rate Diff.
CAL-D	-0.63	-0.10	-0.53	-0.10	-0.35	-0.56	-0.22
CCI-A	1.51	0.73	0.79	-0.39	0.17	-1.78	-0.46
COR-03B	0.24	0.45	-0.22	0.12	0.36	0.49	0.14
HDSP-B	-1.24	-1.08	-0.16	0.38	0.05	2.91	0.57
KVSP-C	-0.57	-0.03	-0.54	0.85	1.29	0.95	-0.17
KVSP-D	-0.38	0.06	-0.44	0.16	0.21	2.07	1.21
MCSP-A	-0.45	-0.37	-0.08	-0.11	-1.79	-1.75	-0.23
RJD-C	-1.13	-0.82	-0.31	-0.43	1.19	1.47	0.97
SVSP-D	0.64	-0.46	-0.70	0.67	0.10	0.22	0.79

Suicides and Attempted Suicides

Because there were no suicides or attempted suicides at HDSP-B during the baseline or the experimental period, it is not possible to test whether cameras had an effect on them. In general, in the HSEC facilities there was a decline in suicides and attempted suicides from baseline to experimental period (Baseline = 29, Experimental = 20).

Staff Using Force

Table 10 compares the number and proportion of incidents, *any* incidents, where staff used force in each of the largest HDSP facilities. From the baseline to experimental periods, there was a reduction in the proportion of incidents with use of force in facilities B, C, and D. Statistically, only the reduction in HDSP-B reached statistical significance. There was an 18.4 percent decrease in use of force from baseline to experimental at HDSP-B, compared to 5.3 percent reduction in HDSP-C, and 6 percent in HDSP-D. The reductions demonstrated at facilities C and D were not statistically significant.

Table 10. Number and proportion of IRs involving staff use of force in HDSP facilities.

	HDSP-A		HDSP-B		HDSP-C		HDSP-D	
	BL	EX	BL	EX	BL	EX	BL	EX
No Force	14	8	33	38	21	26	45	42
Force Used	20	12	55	30	18	18	37	27
Total	34	20	88	68	39	44	82	69
% Total	58.8%	60.0%	62.5%	44.1%	46.2%	40.9%	45.1%	39.1%
	$\chi^2(1)=.01, p=n.s.$		$\chi^2(1)=5.23, p<.05$		$\chi^2(1)=.23, p=n.s.$		$\chi^2(1)=.55, p=n.s.$	

Table 11 compares the number and proportion of *violent* incidents where force was used. In general, there are far fewer violent incidents per facility. Fewer incidents means decreased power to detect statistical significance. Thus, while statistics are provided, the overall trend in the effect is more important to consider than significance. From baseline to experimental period, the proportion of incidents where force was used was reduced in all of the large HDSP facilities. Use of force was reduced in HDSP-A by 11.6 percent, in HDSP-B by 14.6 percent, in HDSP-C by 8.1 percent, and in HDSP-D by 8.4 percent. The decline at HDSP-B is trending toward statistical significance, and was the largest reduction in any of the facilities.

Table 11. Number and proportion of violent IRs involving staff use of force in HDSP facilities.

	HDSP-A		HDSP-B		HDSP-C		HDSP-D	
	BL	EX	BL	EX	BL	EX	BL	EX
No Force	7	5	12	14	5	8	4	6
Force Used	19	8	52	28	17	18	35	26
Total	26	13	64	42	22	26	39	32
% Total	73.1%	61.5%	81.3%	66.7%	77.3%	69.2%	89.7%	81.3%
	$\chi^2(1)=.54, p=n.s.$		$\chi^2(1)=2.91, p<.10$		$\chi^2(1)=.39, p=n.s.$		$\chi^2(1)=1.05, p=n.s.$	

Table 12 and 13 compare the proportion of all incidents and violent incidents that result in use of force at HDSP-B with the other Level 4 SNY HSEC facilities. While some facilities showed decreases in use of force, no facility saw a decrease like HDSP-B. This pattern holds for all incidents as well as just violent incident reports.

Table 12. Number and proportion of IRs involving staff use of force in Level 4 SNY facilities

	CCI-A		COR-03B		HDSP-B		KVSP-C		KVSP-D		SVSP-D	
	BL	EX										
No Force	17	19	69	66	33	38	58	53	21	30	65	55
Force Used	71	81	82	92	55	30	85	68	78	61	127	91
Total	88	100	151	158	88	68	143	121	99	91	192	146
% Total	80.7%	81.0%	54.3%	58.2%	62.5%	44.1%	59.4%	56.2%	78.8%	67.0%	66.1%	62.3%
	$\chi^2(1)=.00, p=n.s.$		$\chi^2(1)=.48, p=n.s.$		$\chi^2(1)=5.23, p<.05$		$\chi^2(1)=.28, p=n.s.$		$\chi^2(1)=3.34, p<.10$		$\chi^2(1)=.53, p=n.s.$	

Table 13. Number and proportion of violent IRs involving staff use of force in Level 4 SNY facilities.

	CCI-A		COR-03B		HDSP-B		KVSP-C		KVSP-D		SVSP-D	
	BL	EX	BL	EX	BL	EX	BL	EX	BL	EX	BL	EX
No Force	3	8	33	25	12	14	14	12	7	10	24	21
Force Used	65	71	71	79	52	28	72	53	67	59	110	79
Total	68	79	104	104	64	42	86	65	74	69	134	100
% Total	95.6%	89.9%	68.3%	76.0%	81.3%	66.7%	83.7%	81.5%	90.5%	85.5%	82.1%	79.0%
	$\chi^2(1)=1.72, p=n.s.$		$\chi^2(1)=1.53, p=n.s.$		$\chi^2(1)=2.91, p<.10$		$\chi^2(1)=.12, p=n.s.$		$\chi^2(1)=.86, p=n.s.$		$\chi^2(1)=.35, p=n.s.$	

Table 14 compares the average number of staff using force per violent incident in the four main facilities in HDSP. As can be seen in Table 14, during the baseline period the number of staff using force at HDSP-B was similar to HDSP-D. In camera areas, on average, 2.25 staff used force per violent Incident Report at HDSP-B as compared to 2.33 at HDSP-D. During the experimental period, only HDSP-B saw a notable decline in the average number of staff using force per incident in camera areas. This suggests that cameras impacted the number of staff using force where it intended.

In general, use of force in non-camera areas (i.e., private spaces) is not as common in any HDSP facility. In addition, over time, the incidence of use of force in private spaces is 0 in Facility A, C, and D. In HDSP-B, however, staff were more likely to use force in non-camera covered areas after camera activation. Similar, to trends in inmate-behavior, this suggests a displacement effect of cameras on use of force.

Table 14. Means (standard deviations) of staff use of force in violent IRs in camera areas during baseline and experimental periods at HDSP.

	HDSP-A		HDSP-B		HDSP-C		HDSP-D	
	BL	EX	BL	EX	BL	EX	BL	EX
Camera	1.52 (1.47)	3.00 (2.58)	2.25 (2.50)	1.74 (1.36)	1.30 (1.03)	2.09 (1.76)	2.33 (2.22)	2.28 (2.19)
No Camera	.33 (.58)	0	.14 (.73)	.44 (.73)	1.00 (1.41)	0	.10 (.51)	0

Table 15 compares the differences in the average amount of use of force per IR incident from baseline to experimental periods in the other Level 4 SNY facilities. A statistical comparison of mean differences suggests that there is no statistically significant difference from baseline to experimental for any of the facilities, including HDSP in either the camera or non-camera areas. However, the decline in use of force in camera areas is larger at HDSP-B than any other Level 4 SNY facility.

Table 15. Means (standard deviations) of staff use of force in violent IR during baseline and experimental periods.

	CCI-A		COR-03B		HDSP-B		KVSP-C		KVSP-D		SVSP-D	
	BL	EX										
Number of Staff Using Force per Incident												
Camera	2.63 (2.25)	2.34 (1.47)	1.51 (1.24)	1.83 (1.53)	2.25 (2.50)	1.74 (1.36)	1.78 (1.39)	1.83 (1.49)	2.08 (1.75)	2.31 (1.49)	2.55 (2.24)	2.23 (1.96)
No Camera	1.50 (1.03)	1.00 (.85)	1.04 (1.74)	1.07 (1.73)	.14 (.38)	.44 (.73)	.95 (.91)	1.06 (.90)	1.22 (1.20)	1.00 (1.11)	.78 (1.13)	1.07 (1.44)

Staff Injuries

Another potential effect of cameras could be improving officer safety. An analysis of staff involvement in IRs and injuries was conducted. Table 16 presents the average number of institutional staff members (officers and other staff) who were victims in violent incidents¹³. In general, the average number of staff victims is relatively low for all facilities. While the magnitude of change is small for any of the facilities, HDSP-B is the only Level 4 SNY that saw a statistically significant reduction in the number of staff victims in both camera and non-camera areas from baseline to experimental period for any IR (not just violent IRs). In other words, the average number of officers and staff who were targets in an incident declined in both camera and non-camera areas in the experimental period at HDSP-B. The trend holds for violent IRs as well but the difference did not reach statistical significance.

Table 16 also shows the change in staff injuries. In this category, HDSP-B has the lowest average number of staff injury at baseline, and no reported injuries in the experimental period.

A detailed analysis of staff hospitalizations is not provided here because it is such a rare event. This study analyzed over 7,000 IRs involving inmates¹⁴ and found that across all HSEC prisons, only 9 staff had been hospitalized during the 7-month baseline period. During the experimental period 7 staff members had been hospitalized for an incident involving inmates.

¹³ The determination of “victim” as opposed to another participant is determined by CDCR staff when completing an incident report.

¹⁴ This count does not include incidents where staff were injured in a CDCR institution and inmates were not involved (e.g., accident, health issues, human error). The count does include if staff were injured responding to an event involving inmates, even if the inmates were not directly responsible for the injury.

Table 16. Mean (standard deviations) of staff victims and injuries from IR during baseline and experimental periods.

	CCI-A		COR-03B		HDSP-B		KVSP-C		KVSP-D		SVSP-D	
	BL	EX	BL	EX	BL	EX	BL	EX	BL	EX	BL	EX
Number of Staff Victims in Violent IR												
Camera	.04 (.28)	.13 (.52)	.16 (.43)	.21 (.44)	.09 (.34)	.03 (.18)	.06 (.24)	.10 (.37)	.01 (.12)	.10 (.30)	.02 (.13)	0 (0)
No Camera	.19 (.40)	.08 (.29)	.17 (.49)	.15 (.36)	.14 (.38)	0 (0)	.05 (.23)	0 (0)	.44 (.88)	0 (0)	.09 (.29)	.21 (.42)
Number of Staff Victims in any IR												
Camera	.03 (.25)	.13 (.50)	.16 (.42)	.19 (.42)	.13 (.42)	.03* (.17)	.08 (.25)	.14 (.42)	.03 (.16)	.09 (.29)	.03 (.17)	.00 (.10)
No Camera	.16 (.37)	.04 (.20)	.19 (.49)	.21 (.41)	.32 (.48)	.12* (.34)	.07 (.25)	.05 (.22)	.23 (.61)	.11 (.33)	.07 (.25)	.15 (.36)
Total Staff Injury in any IR												
Camera	.19 (.53)	.16 (.47)	.09 (.34)	.18 (.49)	.03 (.17)	0 (0)	0.24 (.51)	.17 (.42)	.10 (.34)	.18 (.50)	.19 (.51)	.10 (.39)
No Camera	.12 (.44)	.08 (.28)	.11 (.37)	.09 (.38)	0 (0)	0 (0)	.02 (.13)	.02 (.13)	.27 (.63)	0 (0)	.23 (.63)	.15 (.50)

*paired t-test significant at $p < .10$

Section IV Summary: This section showed no evidence that non-violent, negative inmate behaviors (i.e., contraband, weapons, controlled substances, lewd behavior) were reduced post-camera activation. This could be because many of those behaviors occur predominantly in private spaces. However, there was a noticeable reduction in use of force and staff victimization in HDSP-B in camera areas during the experimental period. This finding was not apparent in other HDSP facilities or other Level 4 SNY facilities.

V. Prison Level Changes

Several outcomes of interest are measured at the prison level. Conceptually, these negative outcomes are important, and could potentially be impacted by camera installation. However, because the data available are measured at the prison level, and cameras were only installed in to cover a third of one prison, it is difficult to detect significant change, even if it has occurred, because the effects could be “diluted” by the majority of the prison without any cameras. These challenges are important to consider during this section of results.

Allegations

As stated earlier in the report allegation data, especially the most recent months, may be incomplete. Due to the nature of updating information, if data were collected today on the same dates of study, the numbers could be larger simply due to data processing. Regardless, the data are presented here to accompany and provide a broader understanding of the potential impact of cameras.

Allegations are classified by CDCR in various categories. This study examines allegations that align well with claims of excessive use of force at HDSP and those that implicate violence and other indicators of relations between officers and inmates. Table 17 outlines allegation data during the baseline and experimental period. In total, the 9 High Security institutions had 1,508 allegations during the baseline period but only 919 during the experimental period. That is over a 39 percent reduction in allegations. It is unclear how much of this reduction is due to allegations not yet filed. The data show that all of the

HSEC prisons, except for Pelican Bay State Prison saw declines in their allegation numbers from baseline to experimental period. Unlike the data on IRs and RVRs where HDSP was always on the lowest end of violence, the allegation data shows that during the baseline period, HDSP has the 4th highest number of allegations. In the post-camera period, HDSP had the largest decline of any of the HSEC prisons in total allegations, (-69.4 percent reduction), though both KVSP and CCI had large declines as well (63.6 percent and 61.1 percent respectively).

Table 17. Change in allegations in HSEC facilities at baseline and experimental periods.

	CCI	COR	HDSP	KVSP	LAC	PBSP	SAC	SATF	SVSP	TOTAL
Baseline	342	163	180	118	113	67	221	86	218	1508
Experimental	133	74	55	43	94	99	140	75	206	919
Total Change	-209	-89	-125	-75	-19	32	-81	-11	-12	-589
% Change	-61.1%	-54.6%	-69.4%	-63.6%	-16.8%	47.8%	-36.7%	-12.8%	-5.5%	-39.1%
Type of Allegation										
Assault	-14	0	-1	0	0	0	0	0	1	-15
Battery	-10	0	1	0	2	-1	-1	-1	1	-9
Discourteous Treatment	-12	-16	-31	-4	2	-4	0	-7	-2	-74
Dishonesty	-50	-21	-7	-20	-5	-4	-21	-2	-11	-141
Discrimination/ Harassment	-2	-6	3	1	1	13	-1	-4	-3	2
Failure to Report	-24	-5	-14	-7	-2	-2	-9	0	-5	-68
Misuse of Authority	0	-2	-2	-2	1	1	-1	0	0	-5
Neglect of Duty	-67	-27	-37	-8	-9	9	-19	-2	4	-156
Use of Force	-11	1	-24	2	-3	-3	-12	8	2	-40
Weapons	0	0	-6	0	-2	2	1	1	0	-4

Table 17 also presents changes in each type of allegation. The OIG report noted that the rate of use of force was particularly high in HDSP-B, and that cameras could reduce the rate of excessive use of force. The previous section showed that use of force did decrease in the experimental period. The data on allegations shows HDSP demonstrated the largest reduction in use of force allegations (reduced by 24 allegations in the experimental period). Most institutions demonstrated a decrease in use of force from baseline to experimental period, but HDSP had the greatest decline. HDSP also saw the largest decline in allegations for discourteous treatment. In general, most prisons saw a decline in the number of allegations from the baseline to experimental period, but HDSP had some of the highest declines in the experimental period.

Officer Use of Force

Numerous types of data on use of force were analyzed for this study. The earlier portion of this study examined use of force reported in the Incident Reports data at the facility level. The prior section analyzed *allegations* of use of force data at the prison level. This section presents the monthly number of use of force incidents and the type of force collected by CDCR at the prison level.

Figure 13 shows the change in the average monthly rate of use of force incidents in the high security prisons from baseline to experimental period. Consistent with the other indicators of violence, HDSP does not have a noticeably high baseline rate of use of force incidents. HDSP ranks 7th out of 9 HSEC institutions. Regardless, during the experimental period, HDSP did demonstrate one of the most significant declines in the use of force incidents. California State Prison, Sacramento had a more significant decline in use of force incidents from baseline to experimental period, however, they also had more use of force incidents than any other HSEC prison at baseline and the experimental period - over 3 times the use of force incidents than HDSP.




Figure 13. Change in average monthly rate of use of force incidents in HSEC prisons.

Figure 14 looks specifically at the changes by types of force used by staff on inmates and shows another way in which HDSP is unique amongst the other HSEC facilities. Force is depicted by different colors in the figure. Chemical force is depicted in purple. Physical force is depicted in green. Weapons force is depicted in blue. The darker bars represent baseline. The lighter bars represent the experimental period. HDSP is the only HSEC prison that demonstrated a noticeable decline in every type of force.¹⁵ The declines at HDSP seem most noticeable for weapons and chemical force.

¹⁵ SVSP also shows a decline in each type of force but the reduction in both physical and weapons force is very slight.




Figure 14. Change in the type of use of force from experimental to baseline period for HSEC prisons.

Inmate Appeals

Table 18 presents the change in the monthly average of upheld inmate appeals at the three levels of reviews. It compares HDSP to the other HSEC prisons. One effect of cameras could be an increase in evidence to be used in appeals. This could either increase the rate of upheld appeals by providing video evidence, or it could decrease the rate of upheld appeals by providing evidence to disprove the claim. Either is equally plausible. In the post-camera period, HDSP upheld significantly more Level 1 and Level 2 inmate appeals. Though upholding more appeals in the experimental period appears to be a common trend at other HSEC facilities, and does not appear to be unique to HDSP.

Table 18. Proportion of appeals upheld at HSEC institutions at baseline and experimental periods.

	Level 1 Upheld			Level 2 Upheld			Level 3 Upheld	
	BL	EX		BL	EX		BL	EX
CCI	30.86 (4.63)	22.43 (5.74)	*t(12)=3.02	39.57 (53.04)	25.57 (12.15)		1.29 (1.70)	.43 (.79)
COR	87.57 (18.27)	104.9 (22.20)		33.00 (14.54)	38.43 (11.33)		4.14 (2.55)	4.76 (3.15)
HDSP	77.29 (7.45)	87.14 (11.90)	*t(12)=-1.86	40.28 (9.41)	75.00 (35.44)	*t(6.84)=-2.50	2.57 (1.72)	2.43 (2.44)
KVSP	24.86 (4.06)	42.14 (17.43)	*t(6.49)=-2.56	28.00 (5.38)	41.28 (15.49)	*t(7.43)=-2.14	2.86 (1.95)	3.14 (1.07)
LAC	46.29 (11.91)	52.96 (9.65)		35.43 (10.41)	47.86 (9.89)	*t(12)=-2.29	1.57 (1.40)	3.71 (2.21)
PBSP	50.57 (7.28)	51.29 (12.54)		38.28 (10.67)	33.71 (7.78)		2.71 (2.06)	1.14 (1.46)
SAC	17.86 (4.30)	25.43 (9.11)	*t(12)=-1.99	49.14 (10.19)	47.57 (10.37)		1.14 (1.58)	3.00 (2.45)
SATF	81.14 (20.69)	90.86 (19.33)		15.86 (6.60)	14.86 (3.62)		1.28 (1.25)	1.28 (1.38)
SVSP	95.00 (13.19)	101.10 (9.23)		61.71 (8.99)	63.71 (7.45)		2.29 (1.98)	2.14 (0.69)

*p<.10, **p<.05

Controlled Substances and Seizures

Figure 15 shows the rate of controlled substance incidents by HSEC prison. Similar to the results yielded examining facility level IRs and RVRs for controlled substance offenses, the prison level data shows no difference in the rate of controlled substance incidents before and after cameras.




Figure 15. Change in average monthly rate (per 100 inmates) of controlled substance incidents by HSEC prison.

Figure 16 shows the change in the total amount of drugs seized by prison (in grams) from the baseline to experimental period. For example, DVI seized over 400 grams less in the experimental period than it did in the baseline period. In contrast, California State Prison, Solano seized more than 400 grams of controlled substances in the experimental period than in the baseline period. The results suggest no camera effect on number of drug seizures incidents (Figure 15) or the amount of drugs seized (Figure 16) at HDSP. HDSP appears quite squarely in the middle of the change across all prisons.

The lack of a camera effect on drug seizures is expected for a number of reasons. First, drug seizures predominantly occur within cells, which would not be covered by cameras. Second, these numbers are reflected at the prison level, and it would be harder to measure change at the prison level for a facility level intervention. Third, but most importantly, drug seizures generally happen when the institution decides to do a cell search or a check. Therefore, the rate would depend heavily on the decision-making of the officers at the prison or the policy governing how often a search should commence. The more often a prison holds a search, the more likely they would be able to seize drugs. Therefore, a decrease or increase in the amount of drugs seized could be an artifact of a change in the number of searches that a prison decided to do from one period to another. The change in searches could just as easily be due to any number of circumstances, many of which would have nothing to do with whether cameras were installed or not.




Figure 16. Change in average monthly quantity of drugs seized from baseline to experimental period by prison.

Suicides and Homicides

The rate of suicides and homicides is very low at HDSP. Most suicides occur in cells; therefore, one would not expect that cameras would have a direct effect on reducing these numbers. However, that is an empirical question. The number of homicides is very low across all the HSEC prisons for any time period. There were 5 homicides during the baseline period across all 9 HSEC prisons, and 5 homicides during the experimental period. Rare occurrence coupled with general location of the event makes it difficult to conclude with confidence that any reduction demonstrated would be due to cameras.

Figure 17 shows that HDSP, in general, had the fewest number of these deaths due to homicide or suicide than any of the other HSEC prisons. After camera installation the rate of suicides and homicides actually increased rather than decreased. Again, there are numerous alternative explanations for this, most of which may have nothing to do with cameras. A displacement effect is not a likely explanation for this result because most of the events probably happened out of camera view in the first place.




Figure 17. Change in the rate of homicides and suicides in HSEC prisons during baseline and experimental periods.

Lockdown Modified Programs

One potential benefit of cameras is to reduce the need for modification of the routine operation of a prison. Lockdowns and modified programs generally occur in response to a security threat or occurrence and can impact one facility or the entire prison. Figure 18 shows the change in the average number of lockdowns at the high security prisons. The figure shows that HDSP has significantly more lockdowns than any of the other prisons in both the baseline and experimental periods. This is not just surprising given the magnitude of the difference, but because the previous results presented in this study showed that HDSP has not had the highest rates of violence, riots, contrabands, suicides, or any other measure of serious security threat.




Figure 18. Change in the number of lockdowns modified program per month in baseline and experimental period for HSEC prison.

HDSP experienced the most dramatic decline in incidence of lockdown modified programs than any of the other HSEC prisons. The data represent a lockdown in any facility or facilities of the prison, and only 3 of the 7 facilities had cameras installed. Therefore, the data are not detailed enough to know if the decrease in lockdown days occurred in the facilities where cameras were installed.

The low incidence of all of the measures of violence but the high incidence of lockdown modified programs requires some critical examination. There are four potential explanations for these contradictory findings. First, a majority of the analysis for this study focuses predominantly on one facility, HDSP-B, but the number of lockdowns reflect the behaviors of all HDSP facilities. A second potential explanation is that the incidents at HDSP, though not frequently occurring, are so serious that they more frequently require a lockdown. A third explanation is that HDSP uses lockdowns for less serious offenses than the other HSEC prisons. The fourth and final possibility is that the official data on incidents collected from HDSP underreport the events that occur. While underreporting is a limitation of any study using official data, it is the potential explanation that most seriously damages the accuracy of the findings of this study. Future studies should explore the reasons for such a high incidence of lockdown modified programs at HDSP.

Section V Summary: This section covers outcomes that are measured at the prison level. While the data in this section have more limitations than the IRs or the RVRs, many of the prison level indicators expected to be impacted by cameras did show declines in the experimental period. The number of allegations and use of force decreased more notably for HDSP than other prisons, while other factors, not as closely supported by camera effect like suicides and drug contraband did not. The most puzzling result is the high number of lockdown modified programs per month at HDSP compared to other HSEC facilities. There were significant declines in the average number of lockdown modified programs per month after camera activation, but there is no strong support, in this study to explain why the rate is so high compared to other HSEC prisons.

VI. Demographic Indicators of Involvement in Incidents

The incident synopsis portion of an incident report includes a description of the event and the inmates involved. The CDCR numbers of the inmates involved were matched to the inmates' demographic file which allows for an understanding of the individuals involved in violence and other incidents. Appendix B includes tables that compare the demographic features of HDSP, with the other HSEC prisons, and the rest of CDCR prisons (Tables B1 and B2). In addition, tables compare the features of all HSEC inmates (Table B3) involved in violent and nonviolent IRs to HDSP inmates (Table B4). Then, Tables B5 through B8 examine HDSP and its facilities specifically for inmate characteristics and involvement in violent incident reports. Table B9 compares the characteristics of inmates involved in any incident report across the Level 4 SNY facilities. This section summarizes the results of those tables generally, but for specific details please refer to the tables referenced in the appendix.

Inmate Comparisons

The data analyzed in this section reflect the inmate population housed in prisons for only male inmates on October 3, 2016. Inmates housed in camps, state hospitals or health care facilities, and community

correctional facilities are not included. Also, prisons that housed female offenders were not included even if they also house male inmates. In total, the population of inmates housed in prison for men on October 3, 2016 included 107,258 inmates. The data show that over half the total population (50.7%) was admitted to CDCR younger than 30 years old. Almost 18 percent of the inmate population must register as a sex offender (PC 290) (17.7%) and 33.2 percent are serving a life sentence. The racial/ethnic breakdown of the male prison population is 43.7 percent Hispanic, 28.2 percent Black, 21.3 percent White, and 6.8 percent another race or ethnicity. A majority of the inmates had no prior commitments (52.6%), 19.8 percent had 1 prior commitment, 11.9 percent had 2 priors, and 15.7 percent had 3 or more prior commitments to CDCR. Approximately one-third of the inmates had some mental health classification given by CDCR (30.1 %). Over 75 percent of the male CDCR population was committed for a person-based primary offense. The county of commitment was also classified into “commitment region”, 33.3 percent of the population was committed from Los Angeles County, 32.2 percent from the other counties in Southern California, while 10.9 percent of inmates were committed from the Bay Area counties, and 23.7 percent from the other Northern California counties (see Table B1).

The HSEC prisons had inmates who were younger at admission to CDCR, had fewer sex offenders, had more inmates on a life sentence, had more inmates with a mental health classification, and had more inmates committed for a person offense than the CDCR population in general. The proportion of inmates of color was slightly higher in the HSEC prisons. The proportion of White inmates in all male CDCR prisons was 21.3 percent, but 18.3 percent in HSEC prisons.

Table B1 provides a statistical comparison of HDSP and the other HSEC prisons. The table shows that inmates at HDSP were younger at the time of their admission to CDCR. HDSP (12.1%) houses less sex offenders than other HSEC prisons (15.2%) and all prisons more generally (17.7%). HDSP has more Hispanic inmates (49.0%) than other HSEC prisons (45.0%) and CDCR in general (43.7%). The inmates at HDSP were more likely to be lifers, less likely to have mental health problems, and have fewer priors than inmates in the other HSEC prisons. The inmates at HDSP were also more likely to be from Northern California or the Bay area than inmates in other HSEC prisons, which makes intuitive sense because of the location of the prison.

Table B2 compares the characteristics of the inmates in each of the HDSP facilities. Statistical comparisons were conducted across the 4 largest facilities (i.e., HDSP-A, HDSP-B, HDSP-C, HDSP-D). Generally, results suggest that the facilities house a very different profile of inmate. This makes sense because the facilities have different designations. HDSP-A is Level 3 SNY. HDSP-B, as stated prior, is a Level 4 SNY. HDSP-C and HDSP-D are both Level 4 general population facilities. As such, the characteristics of the inmates in Facilities C and D are more similar than the inmates housed in facilities A or B. The inmates in HDSP-B were committed to CDCR younger than those at HDSP-A but not as young as those in Facilities C and D. Facility B inmates were less likely to be sex offenders than Facility A, but more likely than Facility C and D. The proportion of Black and Hispanic inmates was higher in Facility B than Facility A but lower than Facilities C and D. HDSP-B inmates were more likely to be lifers than any of the other facilities, and they were more likely to have a mental health designation than inmates in the other facilities. Inmates in Facility B had more prior commitments than the other facilities and had a higher proportion of inmates committed for a crime against person.

Inmates Involved in Violent v. Non-Violent Incidents

Table B3 compares the characteristics of inmates at the HSEC facilities involved in violent incidents with those involved in non-violent incidents. No statistical differences were found in the age of admission to CDCR or number of prior commitments. Inmates involved in violent incidents were less likely to be sex offenders or lifers. Inmates involved in violence were more likely to have a mental health designation and slightly more likely to have been committed for a property offense.

A comparison of HDSP inmates involved in non-violent and violent incidents is provided in Table B4. Generally, there are few statistically significant differences by characteristic. Inmates at HDSP involved in violent incidents were more likely to have a mental health diagnosis than those involved in non-violent incidents.¹⁶ Inmates at HDSP involved in violent incidents were also more likely to be from Northern California than inmates at HDSP involved in non-violent incidents.

Inmates Involved in Violent Incidents at HDSP and Comparison Groups

A comparison of inmates involved in violence at HDSP compared to the other HSEC prisons (Table B5) shows that violent inmates at HDSP were more likely to be younger at admission to CDCR. HDSP inmates involved in violence were less likely to be sex offenders than the violent inmates at the other HSEC prisons. Inmates involved in violence at HDSP were less likely to be Black or have a mental health designation as compared to the other HSEC facilities. The HDSP inmates also had fewer prior commitments.

Table B6 compares the inmate characteristics at HDSP during the baseline and experimental periods. Overall, Table B6 shows that inmate involvement in violent incidents was uniformly distributed across all characteristics of inmates at HDSP. Any differences between inmates involved in non-violent and violent incidents at baseline were marginal. Similarly, there were few and only marginal differences between inmates involved and non-violent and violent incidents in the experimental period. Importantly, there were no significant differences in the characteristics of HDSP inmates involved in non-violent incidents from baseline to experimental periods (statistical results not shown on table). There were also no significant differences in the characteristics of HDSP inmates involved in violent incidents from baseline to experimental periods (statistical results not shown on table).

A closer look just at inmates involved in violence at HDSP shows that the types of inmates involved in violence vary significantly by facility. However, Table B2 is a good reminder that the inmates on each of the facilities are categorically different to start. Therefore, to understand if the proportion of inmates involved in violence is unexpected, given the demographic profile of the facility, a comparison of tables B2 to B7 must be considered. This comparison shows that, for HDSP-B, the proportion of inmates involved in violence pretty closely mirrors what would be expected given the characteristics of inmates housed on that unit. However, the proportion of sex offenders involved in violence on HDSP-B was lower than proportion of sex offenders in the facility in general (Percent sex offenders on HDSP-B = 16%, Percent sex offenders involved in violence on HDSP-B= 9.3%). On HDSP-B, the proportion of Hispanic inmates involved in violence was lower than the general facility population (Percent Hispanic inmates on HDSP-B = 46.8%, Percent Hispanic inmates involved in violence on HDSP-B = 39.6%). The results were

¹⁶ This comparison did not include inmates involved in suicides, attempted suicides or accidents/health issues.

opposite for Black inmates. A higher proportion of Black inmates were involved in a violent incident report (28.6%) compared to the proportion of Black inmates on HDSP-B (21.6%). Fewer lifers were involved in violent incidents that would be expected by the HDSP-B population (Lifers on HDSP-B = 46.7%, Lifers involved in violent incidents on HDSP-B = 37.9%). Finally, more inmates with mental health diagnoses were involved in violent incidents at HDSP-B (61.0%) than expected given the facility population (50.3%).

Table B8 breaks the HDSP facility comparisons down further into a comparison of baseline and experimental periods. Dividing data into such nuanced categories distributes the sample size to a point where statistical comparisons are problematic. Therefore, this table is provided primarily for examination of trends. In general, there are no particularly notable differences in the changes of characteristics of inmates involved in violent incidents from baseline to experimental for the four largest facilities. There are noticeable differences in the inmates involved in violence across the facilities, but this is likely due to the difference in the inmates who are housed there.

HDSP inmates v. Other Level 4 SNY inmates

The purpose of Table B9 is to compare the characteristics of inmates involved in incidents in the Level 4 SNY facilities in HSEC prisons. A comparison of the four main HDSP facilities showed that the inmates in those facilities are significantly different from HDSP-B. Table B9 shows a profile of inmates involved in incidents in the Level 4 SNY HSEC facilities are more similar to HDSP-B. Thus, it appears that the Level 4 SNY facilities are a good comparison group for HDSP-B. The most notable difference is the proportion of inmates with a mental health designation which ranges from 46.5 percent of inmates involved in an incident at CCI-A to 92.7 percent of inmates involved in an incident at SVSP-D.

Section IV Summary: The demographic analysis shows that the types of inmates housed at HDSP are unique from other HSEC prisons and from all other CDCR prisons. The profile of inmates within HDSP varies significantly by facility also. Generally, sex offenders and lifers are less likely to be involved in violent incidents than non-sex offenders and non-lifers. Individuals with mental health designations are more likely to be involved in violence. Comparing the characteristics of inmates in HDSP-B involved in violence to the population of inmates in that facility support the finding that violent inmates are less likely to be sex offenders, less likely to be lifers, more likely to have mental health designations. Also in HDSP-B, Black inmates were more likely and Hispanic inmates were less likely to be involved in violent incidents. But the race effect may be unique to HDSP-B, as it is not apparent in other HDSP facilities.

Conclusions

These study results suggest that, when all evidence is considered, violence was lower after camera installation in HDSP. The evidence is relatively consistent with cameras in that the reductions occur most reliably in areas of the prisons where cameras were installed and have the most significant impact on behaviors in public spaces like violence. Cameras were intended to reduce violence, use of force, and allegations against staff, and these results show that the data all support those declines. Importantly,

the declines were not trivial. The findings of this study also show that the declines at HDSP-B are unique and greater than those experienced at other facilities.

However, the results of this study cannot confirm that the installation of AVSS was the reason for the decline in violence. The timing of the violence decline does not always coincide with the activation of cameras in October. In addition, declines in violence were notable in areas of HDSP where cameras were not installed which supports either an alternative explanation or an amplification effect of cameras. We know that after the OIG report in 2015, HDSP implemented numerous changes to its staffing, training, procedures, and programming (Spearman, March 9, 2016). It is possible that some combination of these changes, including camera activation, is the true cause of the declines in violence at HDSP.

As is standard practice in the field, we note limitations of the current study and areas for future research. To fully understand the impact of cameras on violence future studies should be conducted that include interviews, surveys or observations of inmates and officers before and after camera installation.¹⁷ These methods, along with official data analysis, can help answer several remaining questions of this study. For example, why was the decline in violent IRs so prominent in July 2016 and not October? Interviews or surveys of staff and inmates could have found that cameras were responsible for the decline because the anticipation of cameras led to behavioral change. If that were true, that would still be support for the deterrent effect of cameras. Interviews or surveys could also help measure changes in the climate of a facility (e.g., increases in perceptions of safety, improved communication with staff, changes in the likelihood to file appeals given more evidence). The benefit of interviews to assess cameras is the ability to ask quite pointedly whether an individual considered cameras before acting. In short, a multi-method approach to evaluation is invaluable to provide the fullest explanation of an effect (or lack of effect).

The findings of this research study also point to two areas that warrant additional study. First, the trends in the data show that violence rates at HDSP-B have been increasing since January 2017. If the rates continue in their current trajectory, a study using a longer follow-up period may no longer find a significant difference in rates of violence. Therefore, we recommend a longer follow-up period to more fully understand the trends in violence. We also recommend a longer baseline period to investigate the initial decline in violent IRs that began in July. A longer study period, both baseline and experimental, will provide a broader understanding of the true trend in violence and be better able to pinpoint when violence was decreasing to help identify the source of the change (and the stability of the effect). A longer period of study would also improve the synthetic cohort design which would help answer these questions.

Second, the high number of lockdowns modified program incidents at HDSP warrants further investigation as it could implicate the data quality. The official data used in this study show that on most measures of violence and other negative behaviors, HDSP is one of or the lowest reporting HSEC institutions. But, it records a relatively high number of allegations and a high number of lockdown modified program incidents per month. Underreporting can be a limitation of studies that utilize official data. However, this finding is particularly noteworthy because the OIG report highlighted lack of reliability in some procedures for inmates to report grievances (Barton, 2015). There has been no

¹⁷ Interviews with inmates and staff were originally intended for multi-method triangulation but this component of the research project was cancelled by the CDCR.

evidence or reason to believe that the data collected for this study was incomplete or otherwise invalid (except where noted in the methods); however, the high number of lockdown days is not consistent with other data we analyzed. Without additional data or the use of multi-methods (i.e., interviews, surveys) there is no way to check the quality of the data and know if it accurately reflects reality.

Regardless of potential limitations and suggestions for future research, this study offers encouragement that violence can be reduced in prison. While this study cannot confirm that cameras were the sole force behind that change, the results of the study suggest they are promising.

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Appendix A

Table A1. IR predictor means for synthetic cohort, HDSP-B versus Synthetic HDSP-B.

Variables	HDSP-B mean	Synthetic HDSP-B Mean	Mean Difference
Age of Admission to CDCR			
18-29	33.4	32.4	0.9
30-39	34.5	35.3	0.8
40-49	20.7	20.2	0.4
50-59	9.7	10.0	0.3
60+	1.8	1.9	0.2
Prior Commitments to CDCR			
0	48.5	51.3	2.8
1	22.3	22.9	0.6
2	14.0	12.5	1.5
3-5	13.8	12.1	1.7
6+	1.4	1.2	0.2
Commitment Offense			
Drug	2.2	2.6	0.4
Other	3.3	4.6	1.3
Person	86.0	85.4	0.6
Property	8.5	7.4	1.1
IRs (per month)	10.1	10.5	0.4
AVERAGE			0.89

Table A2. RVR predictor means for synthetic cohort, HDSP-B and Synthetic HDSP-B.

Variables	HDSP-B mean	Synthetic HDSP-B Mean	Mean Difference
Lifer	46.3	43.9	2.4
Age of Admission to CDCR			
18-29	33.5	32.8	0.7
30-39	34.5	34.5	0.0
40-49	20.6	20.2	0.4
50-59	9.7	10.2	0.5
60+	1.8	2.2	0.5
Prior Commitments to CDCR			
0	48.5	49.0	0.5
1	22.4	22.4	0.0
2	14.0	14.4	0.4
3-5	13.8	12.9	0.9
6+	1.4	1.3	0.1
Commitment Offense			
Drug	2.2	2.8	0.6
Other	3.3	4.8	1.5
Person	86.0	85.1	0.9
Property	8.5	7.3	1.2
RVRs (per month)	29.7	29.7	0.1
AVERAGE			0.67

Appendix B

Table B1. Demographic comparison of total CDCR population, high security prisons, and High Desert State Prison on October 3, 2016.

	All CDCR		Other HSEC Prisons		HDSP		HSEC v HDSP
	N	%	n	%	n	%	
TOTAL	107,258	100.0%	33,522	31.3%	3,767	3.5%	
Age of Admission to CDCR							*** $\chi^2(5)=128.92$
<18	1,304	1.2%	634	1.9%	94	2.5%	
18-29	53,057	49.5%	19,359	57.8%	2,450	65.0%	
30-39	28,612	26.7%	8,118	24.2%	805	21.4%	
40-49	15,317	14.3%	3,767	11.2%	283	7.5%	
50-59	6,924	6.5%	1,385	4.1%	114	3.0%	
>60	2,044	1.9%	259	0.8%	21	0.6%	
Sex Offender (PC290)							*** $\chi^2(1)=31.41$
No	88,305	82.3%	28,429	84.8%	3,311	87.9%	
Yes	18,953	17.7%	5,093	15.2%	456	12.1%	
Race/Ethnicity							*** $\chi^2(3)=47.56$
Black	30,260	28.2%	10,304	30.7%	979	26.0%	
Hispanic	46,874	43.7%	15,074	45.0%	1,847	49.0%	
White	22,888	21.3%	6,122	18.3%	706	18.7%	
Other	7,236	6.8%	2,022	6.0%	235	6.2%	
Lifer Status							** $\chi^2(1)=8.53$
No	71,628	66.8%	20,221	60.3%	2,355	62.5%	
Yes	35,630	33.2%	13,301	39.7%	1,412	37.5%	
Mental Health							*** $\chi^2(2)=229.42$
No	65,752	61.3%	17,806	53.1%	2,438	64.7%	
Yes	32,247	30.1%	13,143	39.2%	1,112	29.5%	
Unknown	9,259	8.6%	2,573	7.7%	217	5.8%	
Prior Commitments							*** $\chi^2(3)=26.55$
0	56,429	52.6%	17,425	52.0%	2,081	55.2%	
1	21,237	19.8%	7,034	21.0%	788	20.9%	
2	12,729	11.9%	4,197	12.5%	436	11.6%	
3+	16,863	15.7%	5,866	14.5%	462	12.3%	
Commitment Offense							$\chi^2(3)=5.75$
Drug	5,126	4.8%	1,080	3.2%	134	3.6%	
Other	10,090	9.4%	2,122	6.3%	262	7.0%	
Person	80,531	75.1%	27,673	82.6%	3,060	81.2%	
Property	11,503	10.7%	2,642	7.9%	311	8.3%	
Commitment Region							*** $\chi^2(5)=215.06$
Bay Area	11,658	10.9%	3,457	10.3%	527	14.0%	
Los Angeles	35,662	33.3%	12,039	35.9%	1,132	30.1%	
Northern California	25,428	23.7%	8,192	24.4%	1,184	31.4%	
Southern California	34,488	32.2%	9,824	29.3%	923	24.5%	
Out of State	15	0.0%	7	0.0%	1	0.0%	
Unknown	7	0.0%	3	0.0%	-	0.0%	

Table B2. Demographic characteristics of the inmate population in HDSP.

	HDSP		HDSP-A		HDSP-B		HDSP-C		HDSP-D		X ²	HDSP-MSF		HDSP-STRH	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%		n	%	n	%
TOTAL	3,767	3.5%	777	20.6%	874	23.3%	899	23.9%	931	24.7%		171	4.5%	95	2.5%
Age of Admission to CDCR											***				
<18	94	2.5%	6	0.8%	13	1.5%	31	3.5%	41	4.4%		-	0.0%	3	3.2%
18-29	2,450	65.0%	359	46.2%	534	61.1%	675	75.1%	750	80.6%		63	36.8%	62	65.3%
30-39	805	21.4%	216	27.8%	234	26.8%	150	16.7%	118	12.7%		60	35.1%	18	19.0%
40-49	283	7.5%	116	14.9%	74	8.5%	35	3.9%	19	2.0%		27	15.8%	8	8.4%
50-59	114	3.0%	66	8.5%	17	2.0%	7	0.8%	3	0.3%		18	10.5%	3	3.2%
>60	21	0.6%	14	1.8%	2	0.2%	1	0.1%	-	0.0%		3	1.8%	1	1.1%
Sex Offender (PC 290)											***				
No	3,311	87.9%	517	66.5%	734	84.0%	878	97.7%	907	97.4%		171	100.0%	88	92.6%
Yes	456	12.1%	260	33.5%	140	16.0%	21	2.3%	24	2.6%		-	0.0%	7	7.4%
Race/Ethnicity											***				
Black	979	26.0%	125	16.1%	189	21.6%	309	34.4%	284	30.5%		36	21.1%	30	31.6%
Hispanic	1,847	49.0%	333	42.9%	409	46.8%	474	52.7%	521	56.0%		64	37.4%	38	40.0%
Other	235	6.2%	55	7.1%	58	6.6%	48	5.3%	50	5.4%		16	9.4%	6	6.3%
White	706	18.7%	264	34.0%	218	24.9%	68	7.6%	76	8.2%		55	32.2%	21	22.1%
Lifer Status											***				
No	2,355	62.5%	501	64.5%	466	53.3%	548	61.0%	593	63.7%		171	100.0%	61	64.2%
Yes	1,412	37.5%	276	35.5%	408	46.7%	351	39.0%	338	36.3%		-	0.0%	34	35.8%
Mental Health											***				
No	2,438	64.7%	386	49.7%	417	47.7%	685	76.2%	735	79.0%		171	100.0%	42	44.2%
Yes	1,112	29.5%	372	47.9%	440	50.3%	109	12.1%	123	13.2%		-	0.0%	51	53.7%
Unknown	217	5.8%	19	2.5%	17	2.0%	105	11.7%	73	7.8%		-	0.0%	2	2.1%
Prior Commitments															
0	2,081	55.2%	422	54.3%	429	49.1%	548	61.0%	567	60.9%	***	70	40.9%	37	39.0%
1	788	20.9%	133	17.1%	191	21.9%	185	20.6%	211	22.7%		36	21.1%	25	26.4%
2	436	11.6%	101	13.0%	123	14.1%	92	10.2%	72	7.7%		31	18.1%	13	13.7%
3+	462	12.3%	121	15.6%	131	15.0%	74	8.2%	81	8.8%		34	19.9%	20	21.1%
Commitment Offense															
Drug	134	3.6%	28	3.6%	18	2.1%	31	3.5%	31	3.3%	***	22	12.9%	3	3.2%
Other	262	7.0%	41	5.3%	28	3.2%	54	6.0%	69	7.4%		62	36.3%	7	7.4%
Person	3,060	81.2%	613	78.9%	754	86.3%	769	85.5%	778	83.6%		55	32.2%	75	79.0%
Property	311	8.3%	95	12.2%	74	8.5%	45	5.0%	53	5.7%		32	18.7%	10	10.5%
Commitment Region															
Bay Area	527	14.0%	140	18.0%	119	13.7%	131	14.6%	84	9.0%	***	38	22.2%	11	11.6%
Los Angeles	1,132	30.1%	129	16.6%	216	24.7%	348	38.7%	370	39.7%		26	15.2%	36	37.9%
Northern California	1,184	31.4%	324	41.7%	331	37.9%	227	25.3%	202	21.7%		68	39.8%	26	27.4%
Southern California	923	24.5%	184	23.7%	208	23.8%	193	21.5%	274	29.4%		39	22.8%	22	23.2%

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

Table B3. Comparison of demographic characteristics of total HSEC inmates with violent Incident Reports and non-violent Incident Reports (IRs).

	Total with IRs		Non Violent IR ¹⁸		Violent IR		Non-violent v. Violent
	N	%	n	%	n	%	
TOTAL	9,897	100.0%	3,049	30.8%	6,381	64.5%	
Age of Admission to CDCR							$\chi^2(5)=5.05$
<18	210	2.1%	61	2.0%	143	2.2%	
18-29	6,591	66.6%	2,076	68.1%	4,231	66.3%	
30-39	2,276	23.0%	676	22.2%	1,487	23.3%	
40-49	614	6.2%	177	5.8%	396	6.2%	
50-59	179	1.8%	56	1.8%	110	1.7%	
>60	27	0.3%	3	0.1%	14	0.2%	
Sex Offender (PC 290)							*** $\chi^2(1)=39.20$
No	8,545	86.3%	2,542	83.4%	5,620	88.1%	
Yes	1,352	13.7%	507	16.6%	761	11.9%	
Race/Ethnicity							*** $\chi^2(3)=24.78$
Black	4,272	43.2%	1,335	43.8%	2,790	43.7%	
Hispanic	3,589	36.3%	1,185	38.9%	2,234	35.0%	
Other	496	5.0%	127	4.2%	348	5.5%	
White	1,540	15.6%	402	13.2%	1,009	15.8%	
Lifer Status							*** $\chi^2(1)=37.40$
No	5,949	60.1%	1,692	55.5%	3,962	62.1%	
Yes	3,948	39.9%	1,357	44.5%	2,419	37.9%	
Mental Health							*** $\chi^2(2)=41.06$
No	3,224	32.6%	1,045	34.3%	2,057	32.2%	
Yes	6,230	63.0%	1,813	59.5%	4,091	64.1%	
Unknown	443	4.5%	191	6.3%	233	3.7%	
Prior Commitments							$\chi^2(3)=4.95$
0	4,456	45.0%	1,388	45.5%	2,849	44.7%	
1	2,466	24.9%	723	23.7%	1,630	25.5%	
2	1,468	14.8%	478	15.7%	928	14.5%	
3+	1,507	15.2%	460	15.1%	974	15.3%	
Commitment Offense							* $\chi^2(3)=10.29$
Drug	262	2.7%	91	3.0%	156	2.4%	
Other	592	6.0%	197	6.5%	351	5.5%	
Person	8,360	84.5%	2,577	84.5%	5,409	84.8%	
Property	683	6.9%	184	6.0%	465	7.3%	
Commitment Region							*** $\chi^2(4)=29.41$
Bay Area	1,002	10.1%	297	9.7%	659	10.3%	
Los Angeles	3,641	36.8%	1,215	39.9%	2,282	35.8%	
Northern California	2,362	23.9%	632	20.7%	1,603	25.1%	
Southern California	2,891	29.2%	904	29.7%	1,837	28.8%	
Out of State	1	0.0%	1	0.0%	-	0.0%	

* $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$, *** $p<.001$

Table B4. Comparison of characteristics of HDSP inmates involved in non-violent and violent incident reports.

¹⁸ Count does not include IRs for accidents, suicides, and attempted suicides.

	HDSP - Any IR		HDSP Non-Violent IR ¹⁹		HDSP Violent IR		Non-Violent v Violent
	N	%	n	%	n	%	
TOTAL	874	100.0%	301	34.4%	560	64.1%	
Age of Admission to CDCR							X ² (5)=3.75
<18	21	2.4%	8	2.7%	13	2.3%	
18-29	635	72.7%	211	70.1%	414	73.9%	
30-39	168	19.2%	65	21.6%	101	18.0%	
40-49	38	4.4%	13	4.3%	25	4.5%	
50-59	11	1.3%	3	1.0%	7	1.3%	
>60	1	0.1%	1	0.3%	-	0.0%	
Sex Offender (PC 290)							X ² (1)=2.46
No	810	92.7%	285	94.7%	514	91.8%	
Yes	64	7.3%	16	5.3%	46	8.2%	
Race/Ethnicity							X ² (3)=5.61
Black	296	33.9%	95	31.6%	199	35.5%	
Hispanic	368	42.1%	142	47.2%	218	38.9%	
Other	48	5.5%	14	4.7%	33	5.9%	
White	162	18.5%	50	16.6%	110	19.6%	
Lifer Status							X ² (1)=0.38
No	551	63.0%	194	64.5%	349	62.3%	
Yes	323	37.0%	107	35.6%	211	37.7%	
Mental Health							*X ² (2)=6.18
No	491	56.2%	186	61.8%	299	53.4%	
Yes	333	38.1%	98	32.6%	230	41.1%	
Unknown	50	5.7%	17	5.7%	31	5.5%	
Prior Commitments							X ² (3)=4.81
0	406	46.5%	133	44.2%	268	47.9%	
1	249	28.5%	81	25.9%	163	29.1%	
2	119	13.6%	51	16.9%	66	11.8%	
3+	100	11.4%	36	12.0%	63	11.3%	
Commitment Offense							X ² (3)=2.39
Drug	29	3.3%	10	3.3%	19	3.4%	
Other	49	5.6%	20	6.6%	27	4.8%	
Person	738	84.4%	255	84.7%	473	84.5%	
Property	58	6.6%	16	5.3%	41	7.3%	
Commitment Region							† X ² (3)=6.88
Bay Area	125	14.3%	38	12.6%	87	15.5%	
Los Angeles	262	30.0%	104	34.6%	154	27.5%	
Northern California	245	28.0%	73	24.3%	168	30.0%	
Southern California	242	27.7%	86	28.6%	151	27.0%	

†p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01

Table B5. Comparison of demographic features of individuals with violent incident reports in HDSP versus other HSEC prisons.

¹⁹ Count does not include IRs for accidents, suicides, and attempted suicides.

	Total Violent IRs		HDSP Violent IR		Other HSEC Violent IR		HDSP v. HSEC
	N	%	n	%	n	%	
TOTAL	6,381	100.0%	560	8.8%	5821	91.2%	
Age of Admission to CDCR							*** $\chi^2(5)=17.85$
<18	143	2.2%	13	2.3%	130	2.2%	
18-29	4,231	66.3%	414	73.9%	3817	65.6%	
30-39	1,487	23.3%	101	18.0%	1386	23.8%	
40-49	396	6.2%	25	4.5%	371	6.4%	
50-59	110	1.7%	7	1.3%	103	1.8%	
>60	14	0.2%	-	0.0%	14	0.2%	
Sex Offender (PC 290)							*** $\chi^2(1)=8.05$
No	5,620	88.1%	514	91.8%	5106	87.7%	
Yes	761	11.9%	46	8.2%	715	12.2%	
Race/Ethnicity							*** $\chi^2(3)=18.02$
Black	2,790	43.7%	199	35.5%	2591	44.5%	
Hispanic	2,234	35.0%	218	38.9%	2016	34.6%	
Other	348	5.5%	33	5.9%	315	5.4%	
White	1,009	15.8%	110	19.6%	899	15.4%	
Lifer Status							$\chi^2(1)=0.01$
No	3,962	62.1%	349	62.3%	3613	62.1%	
Yes	2,419	37.9%	211	37.7%	2208	37.9%	
Mental Health							*** $\chi^2(2)=142.04$
No	2,057	32.2%	299	53.4%	1758	30.2%	
Yes	4,091	64.1%	230	41.1%	3861	66.3%	
Unknown	233	3.7%	31	5.5%	202	3.5%	
Prior Commitments							** $\chi^2(3)=14.15$
0	2,849	44.7%	268	47.9%	2581	44.3%	
1	1,630	25.5%	163	29.1%	1467	25.2%	
2	928	14.5%	66	11.8%	862	14.8%	
3+	974	15.3%	63	11.3%	911	15.7%	
Commitment Offense							$\chi^2(3)=2.78$
Drug	156	2.4%	19	3.4%	137	2.4%	
Other	351	5.5%	27	4.8%	324	5.6%	
Person	5,409	84.8%	473	84.5%	4936	84.8%	
Property	465	7.3%	41	7.3%	424	7.3%	
Commitment Region							*** $\chi^2(3)=34.37$
Bay Area	659	10.3%	87	15.5%	572	9.8%	
Los Angeles	2,282	35.8%	154	27.5%	2128	36.6%	
Northern California	1,603	25.1%	168	30.0%	1435	24.7%	
Southern California	1,837	28.8%	151	27.0%	1686	29.0%	

Table B6. Comparison of demographic characteristics of HDSP inmates involved in violent and non-violent incident reports at baseline and experimental periods.

	Total					Baseline					Experimental				
	HDSP Non Violent		HDSP Violent		χ^2	HDSP Non Violent		HDSP Violent		χ^2	HDSP Non Violent		HDSP Violent		χ^2
	n	%	n	%	p	n	%	n	%	p	n	%	n	%	p
TOTAL	301	34.4%	560	64.1%		156		326			145		234		
Age of Admission to CDCR															
<18	8	2.7%	13	2.3%		6	3.9%	6	1.9%		2	1.4%	7	3.0%	
18-29	211	70.1%	414	73.9%		109	69.9%	241	73.9%		102	70.3%	173	73.9%	
30-39	65	21.6%	101	18.0%		34	21.8%	63	19.3%		31	21.4%	38	16.2%	
40-49	13	4.3%	25	4.5%		5	3.2%	13	4.0%		8	5.5%	12	5.1%	
50-59	3	1.0%	7	1.3%		1	0.6%	3	0.9%		2	1.4%	4	1.7%	
>60	1	0.3%	-	0.0%		1	0.6%	0	0.0%		0	0.0%	0	0.0%	
Sex Offender (PC290)															
No	285	94.7%	514	91.8%		148	94.9%	294	90.2%	+	137	94.5%	220	94.0%	
Yes	16	5.3%	46	8.2%		8	5.1%	32	9.8%		8	5.5%	14	6.0%	
Race/Ethnicity															
Black	95	31.6%	199	35.5%		48	30.8%	124	38.0%		47	32.4%	75	32.1%	
Hispanic	142	47.2%	218	38.9%		75	48.1%	122	37.4%		67	46.2%	96	41.0%	
Other	14	4.7%	33	5.9%		10	6.4%	18	5.5%		4	2.8%	15	6.4%	
White	50	16.6%	110	19.6%		23	14.7%	62	19.0%		27	18.6%	48	20.5%	
Lifer Status															
No	194	64.5%	349	62.3%		95	60.9%	206	63.2%		99	68.3%	143	61.1%	
Yes	107	35.6%	211	37.7%		61	39.1%	120	36.8%		46	31.7%	91	38.9%	
Mental Health															
No	186	61.8%	299	53.4%	*	93	56.9%	163	50.0%		93	64.1%	136	58.1%	
Yes	98	32.6%	230	41.1%		53	34.0%	144	44.2%		45	31.0%	86	36.8%	
Unknown	17	5.7%	31	5.5%		10	6.4%	19	5.8%		7	4.8%	12	5.1%	
Prior Commitments															
0	133	44.2%	268	47.9%		65	41.7%	151	46.3%		68	46.9%	117	50.0%	+
1	81	25.9%	163	29.1%		52	33.3%	105	32.2%		29	20.0%	58	24.8%	
2	51	16.9%	66	11.8%		20	12.8%	38	11.7%		31	21.4%	28	12.0%	
3+	36	12.0%	63	11.3%		19	12.2%	32	9.8%		17	11.7%	31	13.3%	
Commitment Offense															
Drug	10	3.3%	19	3.4%		4	2.6%	10	3.1%		6	4.1%	9	3.9%	
Other	20	6.6%	27	4.8%		12	7.7%	17	5.2%		8	5.5%	10	4.3%	
Person	255	84.7%	473	84.5%		134	85.9%	274	84.1%		121	83.5%	199	85.0%	
Property	16	5.3%	41	7.3%		6	3.9%	25	7.7%		10	6.9%	16	6.8%	

(Continued)	Total					Baseline					Experimental				
	HDSP Non Violent		HDSP Violent		X^2	HDSP Non Violent		HDSP Violent		X^2	HDSP Non Violent		HDSP Violent		X^2
	n	%	n	%	p	n	%	n	%	p	n	%	n	%	p
Commitment Region															
Bay Area	38	12.6%	87	15.5%		16	10.3%	52	16.0%		22	14.2%	35	15.0%	
Los Angeles	104	34.6%	154	27.5%		50	32.1%	84	25.8%		54	37.2%	70	29.9%	
Northern California	73	24.3%	168	30.0%		39	25.0%	103	31.6%		34	23.5%	65	27.8%	
Southern California	86	28.6%	151	27.0%		51	32.7%	87	26.7%		35	24.1%	64	27.4%	

** $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$*

No statistically significant differences in the demographic characteristics of individuals involved in violent IRs from baseline to experimental period (i.e., all chi-square comparisons were not significant, results not shown in table).

Table B7. Comparison of inmates involved in violent incidents in HDSP facilities across experimental period.

	HDSP Violent		HDSP-A Violent		HDSP-B Violent		HDSP-C Violent		HDSP-D Violent		χ^2
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	P
TOTAL	560		69		182		132		157		
Age of Admission to CDCR	***										
<18	13	2.3%	-	0.0%	3	1.7%	1	0.8%	9	5.7%	
18-29	414	73.9%	39	56.5%	130	71.4%	108	81.8%	120	76.4%	
30-39	101	18.0%	21	30.4%	35	19.2%	19	14.4%	23	14.7%	
40-49	25	4.5%	5	7.3%	12	6.6%	4	3.0%	4	2.6%	
50-59	7	1.3%	4	5.8%	2	1.1%	-	0.0%	1	0.6%	
>60	-	0.0%	-	0.0%	-	0.0%	-	0.0%	-	0.0%	
Sex Offender (PC290)	***										
No	514	91.8%	51	73.9%	165	90.7%	130	98.5%	150	95.5%	
Yes	46	8.2%	18	26.1%	17	9.3%	2	1.5%	7	4.5%	
Race/Ethnicity	***										
Black	199	35.5%	12	17.4%	52	28.6%	45	34.1%	80	51.0%	
Hispanic	218	38.9%	31	44.9%	72	39.6%	65	49.2%	42	26.8%	
Other	33	5.9%	5	7.3%	12	6.6%	3	2.3%	13	8.3%	
White	110	19.6%	21	30.4%	48	25.3%	19	14.4%	22	14.0%	
Lifer Status	***										
No	349	62.3%	54	78.3%	113	62.1%	82	62.1%	82	52.2%	
Yes	211	37.7%	15	21.7%	69	37.9%	50	37.9%	75	47.8%	
Mental Health	***										
No	299	53.4%	27	39.1%	69	37.9%	96	72.7%	100	63.7%	
Yes	230	41.1%	41	59.4%	111	61.0%	19	14.4%	47	29.9%	
Unknown	31	5.5%	1	1.5%	2	1.1%	17	12.9%	10	6.4%	
Prior Commitments	+										
0	268	47.9%	33	47.8%	79	43.4%	64	48.5%	83	52.9%	
1	163	29.1%	14	20.3%	54	29.7%	36	27.3%	52	33.1%	
2	66	11.8%	10	14.5%	23	12.6%	20	15.2%	12	7.6%	
3+	63	11.3%	12	17.4%	26	14.3%	12	9.1%	10	6.4%	
Commitment Offense	**										
Drug	19	3.4%	7	10.1%	5	2.8%	4	3.0%	1	0.6%	
Other	27	4.8%	7	10.1%	6	3.3%	4	3.0%	10	6.4%	
Person	473	84.5%	50	72.5%	156	85.7%	112	84.9%	138	87.9%	
Property	41	7.3%	5	7.3%	15	8.2%	12	9.1%	8	5.1%	
Commitment Region	***										
Bay Area	87	15.5%	13	18.8%	28	15.4%	19	14.4%	23	14.7%	
Los Angeles	154	27.5%	9	13.0%	41	22.5%	48	36.6%	51	32.5%	
Northern California	168	30.0%	31	44.9%	66	36.3%	28	21.2%	35	22.3%	
Southern California	151	27.0%	16	23.2%	47	25.5%	37	28.0%	48	30.6%	

†p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

Table B8. Baseline and experimental period comparisons of inmates involved in violent incident reports in HDSP facilities.

	Baseline								Experimental							
	HDSP-A Violent		HDSP-B Violent		HDSP-C Violent		HDSP-D Violent		HDSP-A Violent		HDSP-B Violent		HDSP-C Violent		HDSP-D Violent	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
TOTAL	50		117		65		84		19		65		67		73	
Age of Admission to CDCR																
<18	-	0.0%	2	1.7%	1	1.5%	3	3.6%	-	0.0%	1	1.5%	-	0.0%	6	8.2%
18-29	30	60.0%	86	73.5%	53	81.5%	64	76.2%	9	47.4%	44	67.7%	55	82.1%	56	76.7%
30-39	14	28.0%	22	18.8%	11	16.9%	14	16.7%	7	36.8%	13	20.0%	8	11.9%	9	12.3%
40-49	4	8.0%	7	6.0%	-	0.0%	2	2.4%	1	5.3%	5	7.7%	4	6.0%	2	2.7%
50-59	2	4.0%	-	0.0%	-	0.0%	1	1.2%	2	10.5%	2	3.1%	-	0.0%	-	0.0%
>60	-	0.0%	-	0.0%	-	0.0%	-	0.0%								
Sex Offender (PC290)																
No	37	74.0%	103	88.0%	64	98.5%	80	95.2%	14	73.7%	62	95.4%	66	98.5%	70	95.9%
Yes	13	26.0%	14	12.0%	1	1.5%	4	4.8%	5	26.3%	3	4.6%	1	1.5%	3	4.1%
Race/Ethnicity																
Black	9	18.0%	34	29.1%	22	33.9%	54	64.3%	3	15.8%	18	27.7%	23	34.3%	26	35.6%
Hispanic	24	48.0%	42	35.9%	33	50.8%	20	23.8%	7	36.8%	30	46.2%	32	47.8%	22	30.1%
Other	2	4.0%	10	8.6%	2	3.1%	4	4.8%	3	15.8%	2	3.1%	1	1.5%	9	12.3%
White	15	30.0%	31	26.5%	8	12.3%	6	7.1%	6	31.6%	15	23.1%	11	16.4%	16	21.9%
Lifer Status																
No	38	76.0%	73	62.4%	39	60.0%	48	57.1%	16	84.2%	40	61.5%	43	64.2%	34	46.6%
Yes	12	24.0%	44	37.6%	26	60.0%	36	42.9%	3	15.8%	25	38.5%	24	35.8%	39	53.4%
Mental Health																
No	21	42.0%	45	38.5%	47	72.3%	47	56.0%	6	31.6%	24	36.9%	49	73.1%	53	72.6%
Yes	28	56.0%	71	60.7%	9	13.9%	29	34.5%	13	68.4%	40	61.5%	10	14.9%	18	24.7%
Unknown	1	2.0%	1	85.0%	9	13.9%	8	9.5%	-	0.0%	1	1.5%	8	11.9%	2	2.7%
Prior Commitments																
0	24	48.0%	52	44.4%	31	47.7%	39	46.4%	9	47.4%	27	41.5%	33	49.3%	44	60.3%
1	12	24.0%	38	32.5%	19	29.2%	33	39.3%	2	10.5%	16	24.6%	17	25.4%	19	26.0%
2	6	12.0%	16	13.7%	10	15.4%	6	7.1%	4	21.1%	7	10.8%	10	14.9%	6	8.2%
3+	8	16.0%	11	9.4%	5	7.7%	6	7.1%	4	21.1%	15	23.1%	7	10.5%	4	5.5%
Commitment Offense																
Drug	3	6.0%	4	3.4%	3	4.6%	-	0.0%	4	21.1%	1	1.5%	1	1.5%	1	1.4%
Other	5	10.0%	4	3.4%	2	3.1%	6	7.1%	2	10.5%	2	3.1%	2	3.0%	4	5.5%
Person	38	76.0%	98	83.8%	55	84.6%	74	88.1%	12	63.2%	58	89.2%	57	85.1%	64	87.7%
Property	4	8.0%	11	9.4%	5	7.7%	4	4.8%	1	5.3%	4	6.2%	7	10.5%	4	5.5%
Commitment Region																
Bay Area	7	14.0%	21	18.0%	6	9.2%	15	17.9%	6	31.6%	7	10.8%	13	19.4%	8	11.0%
Los Angeles	8	16.0%	27	23.1%	25	38.5%	23	27.4%	1	5.3%	14	21.5%	23	34.3%	28	38.4%
Northern California	23	46.0%	42	35.9%	13	20.0%	20	23.8%	8	42.1%	24	36.9%	15	22.4%	15	20.6%
Southern California	12	24.0%	27	23.1%	21	32.3%	26	31.0%	4	21.1%	20	30.8%	16	23.9%	22	30.1%

Table B9. Comparison of characteristics of inmates involved in IRs in Level 4 HSEC SNY facilities for entire research period.

	CCI-A		COR-03B		HDSP-B		KVSP-C		KVSP-D		SVSP-D	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
TOTAL	302		492		251		328		259		554	
Age of Admission												
<18	2	0.7%	5	1.0%	4	1.6%	6	1.9%	2	0.8%	6	1.1%
18-29	210	69.8%	305	62.5%	177	70.5%	226	69.8%	173	66.8%	332	60.8%
30-39	73	24.3%	128	26.2%	49	19.5%	67	20.7%	63	24.3%	155	28.4%
40-49	14	4.7%	42	8.6%	18	7.2%	22	6.8%	16	6.2%	41	7.5%
50-59	2	0.7%	8	1.6%	2	0.8%	3	0.9%	4	1.5%	12	2.2%
>60	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	1	0.4%	0	0.0%	1	0.4%	0	0.0%
PC290 Flag												
No	267	88.7%	394	80.7%	224	89.2%	227	85.5%	225	86.9%	431	78.9%
Yes	34	11.3%	94	19.3%	27	10.8%	47	14.5%	34	13.1%	115	21.1%
Race/Ethnicity												
Black	44	14.6%	145	29.7%	72	28.7%	70	21.6%	43	16.6%	175	32.1%
Hispanic	175	58.1%	201	41.2%	101	40.2%	164	50.6%	144	55.6%	191	35.0%
Other	12	4.0%	34	7.0%	18	7.2%	20	6.2%	16	6.2%	29	5.3%
White	70	23.3%	108	22.1%	60	23.9%	70	21.6%	56	21.6%	151	27.7%
Lifer Status												
No	206	68.4%	282	57.8%	154	61.4%	181	55.9%	138	53.3%	350	64.1%
Yes	95	31.6%	206	42.2%	97	38.7%	143	44.1%	121	46.7%	196	35.9%
Mental Health												
No	156	51.8%	83	17.0%	102	40.6%	82	25.3%	68	26.3%	35	6.4%
Yes	140	46.5%	401	82.2%	147	58.6%	236	72.8%	188	72.6%	506	92.7%
Unknown	5	1.7%	4	0.8%	2	0.8%	6	1.9%	3	1.2%	5	0.9%
Prior Commitments												
0	116	38.5%	195	40.0%	111	44.2%	147	45.4%	110	42.5%	206	37.7%
1	90	29.9%	128	26.2%	68	27.1%	81	25.0%	64	24.7%	116	21.3%
2	47	15.6%	80	16.4%	36	14.3%	55	17.0%	37	14.3%	101	18.5%
3+	48	16.0%	85	17.4%	36	14.3%	41	12.7%	48	18.5%	123	22.5%
Commitment Offense												
Drug	8	2.7%	8	1.6%	6	2.4%	3	0.9%	4	1.5%	9	1.7%
Other	26	8.6%	26	5.3%	10	4.0%	18	5.6%	13	5.0%	41	7.5%
Person	246	81.7%	423	86.7%	215	85.7%	284	87.7%	230	88.8%	445	81.5%
Property	21	7.0%	31	6.4%	20	8.0%	19	5.9%	12	4.6%	51	9.3%
Commitment Region												
Bay Area	18	6.0%	52	10.7%	43	17.1%	25	7.7%	19	7.3%	6	11.7%
Los Angeles	109	32.2%	152	31.2%	59	23.5%	117	36.1%	81	31.3%	121	22.2%
Northern California	66	21.9%	129	26.4%	92	36.7%	84	25.9%	76	29.3%	171	31.3%
Southern California	180	35.9%	155	31.8%	57	22.7%	98	30.2%	83	32.1%	190	34.8%

Appendix C

CDCR was afforded the opportunity to review and comment on this final report. During their review, they identified 3 areas of disagreement with the report. CDCR's critiques and explanations are included here as they were submitted to the authors:

- Page 5: "According to CDCR, a lockdown should not occur for more than a 24-hour period."

On January 18, 2018 CDCR provided University of California, Irvine (UCI) an e-mail containing definitions of lockdowns and modified programs that indicated CDCR doesn't participate in lockdowns for more than 24 hour periods. CDCR has determined the following additional information is necessary: Either a lockdown or a modified program may occur due to a large scale inmate disturbance (riot, inmate homicide, serious battery of staff). Lockdowns are rare, but may be used if the disturbance impacts different parts of the prison or potentially multiple prisons, if the focus of the inmate activity is directed toward staff, or it is unknown what segment of the population is involved. If the lockdown lasts more than 24 hours, a program status report has to be generated and approved by the Warden and the Associate Director. As staff work through a threat assessment and more information is obtained, a lockdown can be changed to a modified program, only impacting a certain segment of the population, or can be closed out with the facility returning to a normal. Often, after an inmate disturbance, the prison may be placed on modified program, while staff conduct their investigation. If the investigation concludes that the event was isolated or there is no ongoing threat, the facility may return to a normal program. If the modified program will last more than 24 hours due to staff continuing their investigation, a program status report has to be generated and approved by the Warden and the Associate Director. As such, a lockdown can occur for more than a 24 hour period.

- Page 13: "The timing of the decline in IR violence in HDSP-B suggest that either the camera effect began before the activation period due to some factor related to camera activation or was due to a non-camera related intervention that was implemented around July 2016."

Warden M.E. Spearman's March 9, 2017 memorandum is not considered an "intervention," rather, a narrative follow-up and status.

- Page 38, footnote: "Interviews with inmates and staff were originally intended for multi-method triangulation but this component of the research project was cancelled by the CDCR."

Initially, this research project proposed to conduct interviews with CDCR staff and inmates at HDSP. However, review of the interview questions by multiple CDCR divisions, CDCR determined that the questions were beyond the scope of the project, could potentially pose security risks to CDCR staff and inmates.